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ABSTRACT 
States have the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right of their people to 
adequate food, including safe and nutritious food. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means states 
must proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access to safe food. A lack 
of resources and capacities can hamper a state’s capacity to develop a proper scientific 
justification as the basis to establish food safety regulations as mandated by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and thus can create inequality in public health protection between 
developed and developing countries. This thesis aims to present a case study of inequalities in 
international food trade vis-à-vis food safety standards and introduces how to tackle the issue by 
using a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to food safety and the concepts of self-
determination, non-discrimination, and equality in food sovereignty.  
Several human rights instruments especially the right to adequate food and nutrition will 
be applied to denounce the perception that “free trade” rules should prevail over public health 
protection. A secondary data analysis of maximum residue limits (MRLs) comparing six 
commodities (wheat, soybean, rice, apples, garlic, and peanuts) was created to display 
quantitively the disparity of food safety standards between WTO members, particularly between 
nineteen developed, developing, and least-develop countries. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted from April to June 2018 to gain insights and perspectives from 14 respondents from 
related stakeholders: public officials, civil society organizations (CSOs), importers, and 
researchers.  
The findings from secondary data analysis indicate that a disparity in food safety 
standards, particularly in MRL standards between the WTO members, indeed exists. All 
developed countries reviewed establish their own national MRLs and add an extra layer of 
protection, the default MRL/positive list. Some developing countries have been developing a 
multi-step deferral policy, i.e., a hybrid process of adopting other international standards such as 
the Codex or the EU MRLs, along with their national standard, as well as adopting a default 
MRL. A multi-step deferral policy may be a strategy for lower-income countries to improve their 
food safety control on pesticide residues.  
Furthermore, interview findings reveal structural conditions in international trade rules 
that, in the case of Indonesia, prevent the realization of the human right to food and food 
sovereignty for its people. Several recommendations to tackle the issues are proposed, as 
follows: increasing awareness and education of the right to food for both the state as duty-bearer 
and the communities; expanding the knowledge of CSOs and their involvement as CSOs in the 
area of food safety and global trade issues; increasing rights holders’ participation and 
sovereignty in food-related policy; evolving the human right to food safety at the international 
level by addressing discrimination and lack of equity in international trade rules concerning food 
safety; democratizing local and national food governance through increased civil society 
participation including by traditional food producers; centralizing food safety governance at the 
national level to maximize food safety and to some extent, lowering subsidiarity to reduce 
market inefficiency; and conducting food law reform in Indonesia. 
Keywords: WTO; SPS; food safety; international trade; human rights; human right to adequate 
food; food sovereignty; Indonesia; inequality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW 
Food is a basic human need that almost all governments have recognized as an 
international treaty right to adequate and safe food and nutrition that they, the governments, 
are obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill. The government of Indonesia has recognized the 
right to adequate food in Indonesia’s Food Law Number 18 of 2012. It states that food is the 
essential human need and its fulfillment is part of human rights, which is guaranteed in the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as a basic component in creating quality 
livelihoods. It also emphasizes the obligation of the state to achieve availability, 
affordability, and fulfillment of food consumption that is sufficient, safe, and nutritionally 
balanced both on the national and local levels by utilizing local resources, institution and 
culture (Indonesia Food Law of 2012, p.1). Furthermore, Indonesia’s Food Law defines 
food safety as: 
A condition and effort that is required to prevent food from the possibility of 
biological, chemical and other contaminants that can interfere, harm and endanger 
the human health as well as not conflicting with religion, belief and culture of the 
society so that it is safe for consumption. (Indonesia Food Law of 2012, p.4) 
This law has been used as the legal basis to develop technical regulations on foods, including 
food safety inspection for imported foods. 
Food safety authority in Indonesia involves multiple food control agencies, e.g., the 
National Agency of Food and Drugs Control (NAFDC), Ministry of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries (MAFF), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry of Trade (MoT), Ministry of 
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Industry (MoI), and other agencies with different roles and responsibilities. NAFDC and MoI 
have the responsibility to regulate processed food as food safety authorities. Meanwhile, MoA 
has the responsibility to conduct food safety control for fresh plant and animal products. The 
MoT has the role of ensuring the balance of regulatory activities between all related agencies 
while maintaining the Ministry’s role as a trade facilitator.  
Since 2009, Indonesia has been struggling to develop adequate import food safety 
policies while balancing international trade, political, and financial issues. In 2009, the 
Indonesian Agricultural Quarantine Agency (IAQA) was mandated by the MoA to conduct food 
safety inspections for imported and exported fresh agri-food products through the Regulation of 
the Minister of Agriculture Number 27 of 2009 in connection with the Regulation of the Minister 
of Agriculture Number 38 of 2009. This regulation became the foundation for food safety control 
of fresh agri-food products at the border, particularly for plant products. The regulation included 
border inspection, sampling, and laboratory testing for 38 fresh plant products. The food safety 
objective of the regulation is to prevent food-borne illnesses, i.e. chemical contamination such as 
pesticide residues, heavy metals, and aflatoxins. In 2011, this regulation was superseded by 
Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011, which was designed to expand the 
scope of inspected foods from 38 commodities to 100 commodities and update the food safety 
standards. In this newer regulation, microbial contaminants such as Escherichia coli and 
Salmonella spp. were added as food hazards. 
In 2015, because of the increasing demand from Indonesian society for more effective 
and efficient mechanisms to control the safety of agri-food products at the border, the Regulation 
of the Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011 was then revised and replaced by the 
Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 04 of 2015. This regulation contains new 
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significant changes to the mechanism of food safety control for imported fresh agri-foods, which 
has the potential to strengthen the food safety system in Indonesia. However, since it was 
deemed by some stakeholders (such as goverments and exporters in the exporting countries, and 
importers) as “too restrictive,” the regulation was amended barely two months after its 
enforcement date and revised into the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 13 of 
2016. Lastly, on November 18, 2016, it was superseded by the Regulation of Minister of 
Agriculture Number 55 of 2016, due to strong opposition from many stakeholders, including the 
governments and exporting firms from exporting countries; Indonesia’s importers and food 
industries; and other Indonesian government agencies.  
Ensuring food safety to protect public health and promote economic development 
remains a significant challenge in both developing and developed countries (FAO, 2016). 
Josling, Roberts, and Orden (2004) contended that public authorities face the dilemma of 
developing food safety policies that are effective yet unobtrusive. These policies need to involve 
every stakeholder, including the private sector; ensure consumer confidence; and “reflect 
national conditions and local preferences and at the same time [remain] consistent with the 
realities of [the] global economy” (Josling et al., 2004, p. 2). The Institute of Medicine (US) and 
National Research Council (US) Committee (1998) stated that “the mission of an effective food 
safety system is to protect and improve the public health by ensuring that foods meet science-
based safety standards through the integrated activities of the public and private sectors” (p. 64). 
Less developed countries are constrained inevitably by limited resources and insufficient 
knowledge to develop adequate food safety policies that are sufficiently protective and 
progressive. Thus, this lack of resources and capacities can hinder their ability to establish an 
adequate scientific justification as required by the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
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thereby can lead to inequality in public health protection between developed and developing 
countries. 
This study analyzes existing Indonesian food safety standards for imported fresh foods 
using a human rights framework and a food sovereignty perspective in order to identify the most 
suitable food safety control mechanism at the border, particularly for fresh products imported 
into Indonesia. It will focus on the disparity of food safety standards between WTO Members 
and the dynamic regulatory changes in the Indonesian Agricultural Quarantine Agency (IAQA), 
including the transition from the first regulation in 2009 to the most recent regulation (2016); the 
challenges confronted during the implementation of each regulation; and the dilemmas faced by 
policymakers to balance the obligation of public health protection and trade facilitation. 
In this thesis, food safety policies are divided into three regimes, each with separate 
distinct mechanisms for food safety control, in order to describe the dynamic changes in 
Indonesia’s food safety regulations over the last decade. The first regime, Regime 1, was under 
the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 27 of 2009 in conjunction with the 
Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 38 of 2009 and the Regulation of the Minister 
of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011. The second, Regime 2, was under the Regulation of the 
Minister of Agriculture Number 04 of 2015 and Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture 
Number 13 of 2016, and the last regime, Regime 3, is the Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 55 of 2016, which has been implemented since the end of 2016 until now.  
A human rights-based approach, with particular reference to the human right to adequate 
food and nutrition, will be applied to challenge the notion that following trade rules is more 
important than protecting public health. The national standards for maximum residue limits 
(MRLs) of pesticide residues and the positive list system are also used to describe the disparities 
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of food safety standards between developing countries and developed countries. Semi-structured 
interviews will be used to provide perspectives from both experts in civil society and public 
sector officials, including policymakers and researchers in Indonesia. Both direct interviews 
conducted in Indonesia and online interviews conducted from the U.S. via Skype and Google 
Hangout provide knowledge, experiences, and opinions regarding the human right to adequate 
food, food sovereignty, food trade, food safety regulation/standards, and food safety inspection. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
1. What is the most efficacious way of using a human rights-based approach to food safety and 
food sovereignty as an expression of group and national claims for self- determination, non-
discrimination, and equality in order to assess existing Indonesian national-level inequalities 
in food safety  
2. What specific food safety control mechanism (at the border) will enable Indonesia to can 
balance public health protection and trade facilitation?  
RESEARCH METHODS 
The motivation for this research is drawn from the needs and gaps in Indonesia’s food 
safety policies as identified by the researcher as one of the actors (a policy officer in IAQA) in 
this field of study. This research is a case study of Indonesia. According to Stake (1995), case 
study research is "the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to 
understand its activity within important circumstances.” Another methodologist, Yin (2014), 
defines case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the 
‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context” (p. 16). This research project was conducted 
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using secondary sources and document analysis as well as primary sources in the form of 
interviews with field experts.  
A. Literature Review 
A literature review is a “systematic, explicit, and reproducible method for identifying, 
evaluating, and interpreting the existing body of recorded work produced by researchers, 
scholars, and practitioners” (Fink, 1998, p. 3). This thesis draws on three categories of 
literature: food safety standards, the human right to adequate (safe) food, and food safety 
control mechanisms for fresh plant products at the Indonesian border. A set of regulations on 
food safety control for imported fresh agri-products was used to examine regulatory changes 
in Indonesia. Several human rights instruments, especially the right to adequate food and 
nutrition, were applied to challenge the perception that “free trade”1 rules should prevail over 
public health protection. In addition, the literature related to the human right to safe food is 
limited, and there are few existing studies on food safety control in Indonesia, especially for 
imported fresh agri-products. 
B. Secondary Data  
The national standards for maximum residue limits (MRLs) of pesticide residues and 
a positive list system were used to describe the existing food safety standards and disparities 
of food safety standards between developed countries, developing countries and least-
develop countries (LDC). Regulations on national food safety standards, particularly MRLs 
for pesticides residues, from 18 countries (USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, 
South Korea, China, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Singapore, Vietnam, 
                                                          
1 While the WTO continuously uses the term “free trade”, the UN body, Codex Alimentarius Commission, employs 
the term ”fair trade” in place of “free trade”. Throughout this study, the author uses the term relevant to the WTO 
or Codex, depending on the context. 
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Bangladesh, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Myanmar) and the European Union (EU) were 
used to provide an overview of the disparity of food safety standards between selected WTO 
members. Testing pesticide residues is a process of selecting which specific pesticides to 
examine from the thousands of established and under development varieties on the market. 
While each state develops their own national standards (MRLs) for pesticide residues, the 
stringency of standard can differ, and some countries may have no or limited MRLs standard 
that may not adequately protect public health. According to WTO rules, to set a stricter 
standard to test pesticide residues (stricter than the international standard such as Codex 
standard), a country needs to undertake research to establish scientific justification for an 
MRL standard for each separate pesticide residue to be tested. Clearly, with the constant 
development of new pesticides, this process is ongoing, time consuming, expensive, and 
requiring of a high level of research expertise. The more MRLs a country can afford to set 
standards for, the more likely that that country has the tools to protect public health. A 
country does not necessarily, or does not typically, test all the MRLs for which it has 
established a standard. It has, however, the capacity to do so, and it follows that public health 
can generally be more protected with the authority to test. Comparison tables of MRL 
standards of six commodities were created to demonstrate the disparities between developing 
and developed countries. Using the data on fresh agri-products imported to Indonesia, six 
main commodities were chosen as representatives, i.e., wheat, soybean, rice, apples, garlic, 
and peanuts. 
C. Primary Data: Semi-structured Interviews  
Gilham (2000) explained that qualitative methods such as key informant interviewing 
and observation focus mainly on the type of evidence (what people tell you; what they do) to 
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help illuminate issues and turn up possible explanations. Since this research aims to explore a 
unique approach to addressing food safety policy in the context of a human rights-based 
approach to food safety and food sovereignty, conducting interviews and a literature review 
to gain data and understanding are reasonable choices to achieve the research objectives.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted from April to June 2018 to gain insights 
and perspectives from related stakeholders: public officials, Civil Society Organizations 
(CSO), importers, and researchers. The Full Expedited Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
protocol from the Syracuse University IRB was approved on April 3, 2018 (See Appendix 1), 
and the first amendment request to add more public sector officials as participants was 
approved on May 10, 2018 (See Appendix 2). In addition, the second amendment to add an 
oral consent form was approved on May 30, 2018 (See Appendix 3).  
Two methods of in-depth interviews were used: face-to-face and online. Face-to-face 
interviews were mostly conducted in three Indonesian cities (Jakarta, Tangerang, and Bogor) 
due to geographical limitations and time constraints. Only one direct interview was 
conducted in Syracuse. Online interviews were conducted using Skype or Google Hangout 
from Syracuse, New York. Participants were asked to return the signed consent form either 
before the interview was started, or after the interview if they had given verbal consent in 
advance. Online interviews were implemented as a result of time constraints related to 
conducting interviews directly in Indonesia. Interviews were generally conducted in Bahasa 
(an Indonesian language) for Indonesian interviewees, with English as an alternative option. 
Sampling 
A mixture of expert sampling and snowball sampling was used to identify prospective 
interviewees. Participation selection for this study was purposive and limited to adults (21 
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years old or older) with at least two years of work experience related to food safety, food 
trade, the human right to food, or food sovereignty. Interviewees were identified and 
categorized into four groups: official public-sector actors or public officials, representatives 
from CSOs, researchers and exporters (See Appendix 5). Interviews were conducted using 
two similar sets of questions with different emphases (Appendix 4). Questions were designed 
to collect information on interviewees’ perception, knowledge, and experience with food 
safety policy, food sovereignty, and the human right to food in Indonesia specifically.  
Number of Interviews 
In total, twenty (20) participants were contacted, and fourteen (14) responded and 
agreed to be interviewed. The complete list of the interviewees can be seen on Appendix 5. 
According to Roller and Lavakras (2015),  
the number of interviews can be decided by four considerations: (i) the breadth, depth, 
and nature of the research topic; (ii) the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the population 
of interest; (iii) the level of analysis and interpretation required to meet research 
objectives; and (iv) practical parameters, such as the availability of and access to 
interviewees, budget or financial resources, time constraints, and also travel and other 
logistics associated with conducting face-to-face interviews (p. 76).  
Since guidelines for determining non-probabilistic sample sizes for interviews are 
virtually nonexistent (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson, 2006), the number of interviews was based 
on the “theoretical saturation” concept, when no new information or themes are observed in 
the data. Researchers have different opinions on how many interviews should be conducted 
before the data saturation point is reached. Guest et al. (2006) concluded that data saturation 
can occur at the level of twelve interviews, but admitted that the result might not be 
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generalizable. Romney, Batchelder, and Weller (1986) calculated that a small sample (four 
individuals) with a high degree of cultural competence can provide extremely accurate 
information at a high confidence level (0.999).  
A study by Hennik, Kaiser, and Marconi (2017) compared two approaches to 
assessing saturation. They considered code saturation and meaning saturation by examining 
the sample sizes needed to reach saturation in each approach, what saturation meant, and how 
to assess saturation. They concluded that nine out of 25 in-depth interviews were needed to 
reach code saturation (when researchers have “heard it all”), while meaning saturation (when 
researchers have “understand it all”) was reached after 16-24 interviews (Hennik et al., 2016, 
p. 591). However, Saunders, et.al., (2017) argued that when and how saturation may be 
determined to have been reached will vary depending on the type of study, “as well as 
assumptions about whether it represents a distinct event or an ongoing process”. Moreover, 
Francis et al. (2010) proposed a method to decide saturation in a theory-based interview by 
following two principles: (i) specify an initial analysis sample; and (ii) specify how many 
more interviews will be conducted without new ideas emerging (p. 1229).  
D. Limitation of methods 
Geographical and technical limitations complicated the research and may have 
influenced data collection. The 12-hour time difference between the U.S. and Indonesia made 
online interviews difficult to arrange. Reliance on online communication was hampered by 
unstable internet connections. The result may have impacted the participation rate and depth 
of discussion. Furthermore, the idea of saturation provides “little practical guidance for 
estimating samples, prior to data collection, necessary for conducting quality research” 
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(Guest et al., 2006, p. 59). Therefore, the degree to which interviews are or are not gaining 
meaningful new information might be biased, which might cause incomplete data. In 
addition, with limited sampling and data, the findings might not be generalizable and only 
applicable to Indonesia as the case study, although Stake (2006, p. 8) argues that “the power 
of case study is its attention to the local situation, not in how it represents other cases in 
general.” 
Summary 
Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
2005, and therefore has the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right of Indonesian 
people to adequate food, including safe and nutritious food. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) 
means that Indonesia must engage proactively in activities intended to strengthen people’s access 
to safe food. The lack of resources and human capacities a disadvantage Indonesian capacity to 
develop proper scientific justification (as mandated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 
which to base satisfactory food safety regulations. This can create inequalities in public health 
protection between developed and developing countries.  
This study focuses on a case study of inequalities in food safety standards in international 
food trade and introduces how to resolve disparities by using a human rights-based approach 
(HRBA) to food safety. Human rights instruments from the global and Indonesian national levels 
that articulate the right to adequate food and nutrition will be applied to challenge the perception 
that “free trade” rules, as promoted by WTO, should prevail over public health protection. Codex 
theoretically promotes an approach to setting food safety standards that calls for a balance 
between public health and “fair trade” objectives. The apparent dominance of trade rules at the 
expense of public health protection calls for a reevaluation of the ratified international treaty and 
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national legal obligations that unequivocally endow the Indonesian population with rights to food 
and food safety.  A secondary data analysis of maximum residue limits (MRLs) of pesticides on 
six commodities (wheat, soybean, rice, apples, garlic, and peanuts) was created to display 
quantitively the disparity of food safety standards between selected WTO members, specifically 
nineteen countries, differentiated by developed, developing, and least-developed status. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted from April to June 2018 to gain insights and perspectives 
from 14 stakeholder respondents representing public officials, civil society organizations 
(CSOs), importers, and researchers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The term “safe food” represents different meanings to different audiences based on 
their perspectives (Seward II, 2003). Some consumers tend to have a rigorous definition of 
safe food and expect it to be absent of health risks, while scientists, public health officials, 
and international organizations expect safe food to “provide maximum nutrition and quality 
while posing minimal threat to public health” (Shank and Carson, 1992). According to the 
FAO (2018), “food safety implies the absence or safe levels of contaminants, bacteria, 
naturally occurring toxins or any other substance that may make food injurious to health.” 
The decision on the minimum risk level that is acceptable can be different, which can be 
based on science or might be driven by commercial or self-interested motives” (Nestle, 
2010, p.16).   
National governments have an obligation to ensure the right to adequate food, including 
safe food. The FAO (2005), in The Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food: to support the 
progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security, 
emphasized the equality and non-discrimination principle, contending that “[f]ood should not be 
used as a tool for political and economic pressure” (Preface, p. 2). The guidelines included the 
obligation of states in realizing the right to safe food: “States should take measures to ensure that 
all food, whether locally produced or imported, freely available or sold on markets, is safe and 
consistent with national food safety standards” (Guideline 9, pp.19-21). Therefore, to safeguard 
food safety, “states need to develop a comprehensive and rational food-control system by 
reducing the risk of food-borne disease using risk analysis and supervisory mechanisms” (FAO, 
2005, Guideline 9, pp. 19-21). 
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This chapter is divided into three parts: food safety standards, the human right to 
adequate (safe) food, and a case study in Indonesia regarding food safety control mechanisms for 
fresh plant products at the border. The first part of this chapter provides an overview of food 
safety standards, including the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in food trade and 
food safety; the international food safety standard organization, Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC); two general approaches in the development of food safety standards; and 
the advantages and disadvantages of the harmonization of food safety standards. The second part 
talks about the concept of the human rights, the right to adequate food, food safety as a human 
right, and the disparity in food safety standards, particularly between rich and poor countries. 
The last part explains the dynamics of regulatory changes in food safety policies for imported 
fresh plant products in Indonesia, particularly at the border during the last decade. 
I. Food Safety Standards in Indonesia 
The authority to conduct food safety inspections of agricultural fresh-foods in 
Indonesia—including the inspection of fruits and vegetables—belongs to the Agricultural 
Quarantine Agency under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The Indonesian Agricultural 
Quarantine Agency (IAQA) was mandated by the Minister of Agriculture to conduct food safety 
inspections for imported fresh agri-food products in 2009. The Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 27 of 2009, in conjunction with Regulation of The the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 38 of 2009, became the foundation for food safety control for fresh agri-
food products at the border, particularly for plant products. The Regulation included inspecting, 
sampling, and testing thirty-eight fresh plant products for chemical contaminations such as 
pesticide residue, heavy metals, and aflatoxins. The following example (Box 1) is a case study of 
microbial contamination in apples imported in Indonesia from the United States. 
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Box 1. Case study of Listeria monocytogenes contamination in apples imported 
from the United States 
At the beginning of 2015, the issue regarding contamination of Listeria 
monocytogenes in apples imported from the United States became national news 
in Indonesia. It was started by a notification from the U.S. Food and Drug Agency 
(FDA) to the government of Indonesia regarding the recall of Gala and Granny 
Smith apples supplied by Bidart Bros. Company. This was due to an outbreak of 
bacterial contamination caused by the consumption of caramel apples (Central for 
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2015). Bidart Bros., of Bakersfield, 
California, voluntarily recalled Granny Smith and Gala apples because 
environmental testing revealed contamination with L. monocytogenes at the firm’s 
apple-packing facility (CDC, 2015). According to the CDC, 35 people from 12 
states were infected, and 34 people were hospitalized. Three out of the seven deaths 
were reportedly caused by Listeriosis. Several countries such as Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines immediately announced a ban or recall 
on imported Granny Smith and Gala apples from the U.S. (The Strait Times, 2015), 
while Indonesia became the last country in Southeast Asia to declare a temporary 
stop on the importation of apples from the U.S. 
The news caused a food-scare among Indonesian consumers since imported 
apples were sold and consumed widely. CNN Indonesia covered the story with a   
report entitled “Recognizing Listeria Monocytogenes, Contaminant Bacteria in 
Imported Apples.” The national newspaper, The Jakarta Post, came up with the 
headline, “RI Banned Some Apples from the United States” (Wahyuni, 2015; 
Yulisman, 2015). Another well-known national newspaper, Kompas, published 
articles such as “Fruit Sellers Should Stop Selling Imported Apples,” which 
asserted that the case should be used as momentum to begin food safety testing, 
especially for L. Monocytogenes in imported fruits (Auliani, 2015; Zamzani, 
2015). The case was ended after Indonesia’s government reaffirmed that no 
Granny or Gala apples were imported from the U.S. to Indonesia prior to and 
during the outbreak (Detik Finance, 2015). 
 
Microbial contaminations were not regulated until 2011 when the regulation standard was 
revised and substituted by the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011. 
This ordinance expanded the scope of inspected foods from 38 commodities to 100 commodities 
and updated the food safety standards. However, this regulation, which was implemented during 
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the outbreak in 2015, did not have a microbial contamination standard for L. monocytogenes. 
The microbial contamination standards included in the 2011 regulation were for Escherichia coli 
and Salmonella spp. The 2011 regulation was renewed into the Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 04 of 2015 that provides new, significant changes to the mechanism of food 
safety control for imported fresh agri-foods with no substantial change to the food safety 
standards. In April 2016, the regulation was amended again into the Regulation of the Minister 
of Agriculture Number 13 of 2016 to revise some provisions and delay the enforcement date. 
However, those regulations, the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 04 in 
conjunction with the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 13, were deemed as “too 
restrictive” (Detik Finance, 2015), and therefore superseded by the Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 55 on November 18, 2016. The microbial contamination standards are still 
unchanged, and no standard for contamination of L. monocytogenes on fresh fruits has been 
established.  
The case of the L. monocytogenes outbreak detailed above illustrates the significance of 
adequate food safety standards during this era when the trade globalization of food has become 
an integral part of the food system. However, achieving an appropriate level of protection 
sufficient enough to ensure public protection can be challenging, especially for developing 
countries like Indonesia (Iwantoro, 2002). The food safety standards regulated in Indonesia’s 
food safety regulations mentioned previously are adopted mostly from the harmonized 
international standard developed by Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), except for the 
microbial contamination standards which are adopted from an outdated Indonesian National 
Standard (Standard National Indonesia [SNI] 7388:2009) regarding the maximum limits of 
microbial contamination on foods. The limited resources and expertise in less-developed 
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countries can hinder the ability to establish adequate national food safety standards, which might 
weaken consumer protection in those countries. During the FAO/WHO Global Forum of Food 
Safety Regulators in 2002, Syukur Iwantoro, the Indonesian Director for the Centre of 
Standardization and Accreditation, reported that “recent experiences in Indonesia have shown 
that constraints in application of [food safety] regulation are mainly due to the limitation of 
resources (human resources, technology, information, funding, etc.)” (Iwantoro, 2002). On the 
other hand, several studies showed how increasingly restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures, including food safety standards, could limit market access and negatively affect the 
economy of poor exporting countries (Otsuki, Wilson, & Sewadeh, 2001; Joseph, 2011). 
I.1. World Trade Organization (WTO), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, and 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC): Internal contradictions between trade and 
public health 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on January 1, 1995, as the 
successor to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and until now has 160 
members representing 98% of world trade (WTO, n.d.)2. The WTO’s primary goal is to “ensure 
that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible” (WTO, n.d.)3. The Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures (the SPS Agreement) was 
enforced with the establishment of the WTO in 1995, with the purpose of ensuring the right of 
WTO members to carry out their expressed duties while also avoiding unnecessary barriers to 
trade (WTO, n.d.)4, as stated in text of the agreement: 
[N]o Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these 
                                                          
2 WTO, no date. What is the WTO. Retrieved December 15, 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm? 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
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measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a 
disguised restriction on international trade” (WTO, 1995, p. 69). 
Each country, as a member of the WTO, has an obligation to comply with the SPS 
Agreement. In addition, the SPS Agreement encourages members to “base their regulations on 
the health and safety standards developed by three relevant international bodies: the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission/CAC (for food safety); the International Plant Protection 
Convention/IPPC (for plant health); and the World Organization for Animal Health (for animal 
health and animal diseases transmittable to humans)” (WTO, 2015). The CAC was created in 
1963 by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) with two primary purposes: “protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fair 
practices in food trade” (Fortin, 2017). The CAC carries the responsibility of developing and 
establishing international food standards and guidelines called the Codex Alimentarius (Food 
Book/Food Code) or simply “Codex” (Fortin, 2017). Currently, the CAC consists of 188 member 
countries and one member organization (the European Community/EU) (FAO, n.d.). Fortin 
explained that “membership in the Commission confers no duties on a nation but allows a nation 
to contribute fully to the development of the standards” (p. 482). 
There are criticisms of the CAC’s dual roles in health and trade. Khanna and Saxena 
(2003) explained that the second responsibility of the CAC, which is to ensure fair trade, may be 
interpreted differently at times. Some may argue that Codex ought to ensure that consumers are 
not misled or deceived by trade practices, while others may regard Codex simply as a way of 
promoting trade interest, asserting that food safety standards should not hinder the free trade 
process (Khanna & Saxena, 2003). Post (2005) pointed out that the main critique of the CAC’s 
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dual mandate is that “public health protection takes a back seat to trade interest” (p. 170). She 
argued that “states agree to free their markets to trade… at the same time, they reassert their 
rights to determine their own safety standards” (p. 171). Furthermore, Fortin (2017) shared the 
same sentiment regarding the dualism of Codex in his book, Food Regulation: Law, Science, 
Policy, and Practice: “The fact that Codex has two goals, ensuring fair international trade and 
protecting public health, raises the concern that trade may override health concerns” (p. 483).   
I. 2. How CAC Develops its Standards 
FAO/WHO (2003) described the procedure of food safety standard development within 
the CAC as shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1. How the Codex Develop their Standards (FAO/WHO, 2003) 
 
 
The CAC developed two kinds of subsidiary bodies: Codex Committees, to formulate draft 
standards for submission to the CAC, and Coordinating Committees, to coordinate food standard 
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activities in the region, including the development of regional standards (FAO/WHO, 2003). 
Each committee (with few exceptions) is hosted by a member country, which is primarily 
responsible for the cost of the committee’s maintenance and administration and for providing its 
chairperson (FAO/WHO, 2003). The process of establishing standards in the CAC can take a 
long time because decisions must be made under a consensus agreement (FAO/WHO, 2003). 
Khanna and Saxena (2003) ascertained that the slowness of the Codex standard formulation 
process could hamper the effectiveness of the standard and its relevance to the newest food 
safety risks or threats. They believed that to ensure that consumer interest becomes the priority, a 
more proactive approach is necessary, and a mechanism should be created to prevent commercial 
parties from influencing decision making in the development of standards (Khana & Saxena, 
2003).  
Livermore (2006) pointed out a disparity between the parties in the Codex process, 
especially between developing countries and developed ones. He argued that the participation of 
the developing countries in the Codex be limited due to lack of resources and “a bias toward 
industry groups, with many fewer active consumer group participants” (Livermore, 2006, p. 
783). Downes agreed that limited participation from the public might cause a bias toward 
industrial interest. He observed that the public’s interest in food policy might be weakened by 
international rules in three ways: “the WTO is perceived to be advancing values other than those 
most important to the general public; the processes the WTO establishes through the SPS 
Agreement act to marginalize public values, and the public is institutionally sidelined by 
inadequate access to decision-making processes” (p. 78). He also argued that since there is a bias 
towards industrial interest in Codex due to limited public participation, heavy reliance on 
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international rather than national standard-setting might marginalize public interest (Downes, 
2014). 
I.3. Two General Approaches to the Development of Food Safety Standards  
The 1995 SPS Agreement allows countries to develop their own national food safety 
standards if the scientific justification has been provided (Art. 2). Fortin (2017) stated that some 
countries adopt Codex standards legislatively, while others—predominantly developing 
countries—use Codex as a model in the development of their own food safety standards (p. 483). 
He further explained that the reason why most developing countries chose to adopt Codex is that 
they consider Codex a strong starting point when initiating a food law. On the other hand, 
“countries with established food laws have generally been unwilling to amend their laws to 
match Codex” (Fortin, 2017, p. 483). 
In her book Safe Food: The Politics of Food Safety, Nestle (2010) compared two 
approaches in the development of food safety standards: “the science-based approach” and “the 
value-based approach.” Nestle summarized the comparison of both approaches in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. “Science-based” and “value-based” approaches to evaluating the 
acceptability of food safety risks (Nestle, 2010, p.17.) 
Science-based Value-Based 
Count and calculates 
• Cases 
• Severity of illnesses 
• Hospitalization 
• Deaths 
• Cost of the risk 
• Benefits of the risk 
• Costs of reducing the risk 
• The balance of risk to benefits 
 
Balance risk against benefit and cost 
Assesses whether risk in: 
• Voluntary or imposed 
• Visible or hidden 
• Understood or uncertain 
• Familiar or foreign 
• Natural or technological 
• Controllable or uncontrollable 
• Mild or severe 
• Fairly or unfairly distributed 
 
Balance risk against dread and outrage 
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She argued that even though those two approaches can overlap and lack detail, the categories can 
be used to make some further generalizations. For example, a scientific-based approach to 
determine the acceptability of a new GMO corn, StarLink corn, might lead to the decision that 
there are no significant reasons to reject the products since there is a low probability of corn 
allergy. However, a value-based approach may assert that without proper labeling or regulatory 
approval, the fact that it is a GMO product can be a reason enough for prohibition (Nestle, 2010, 
p.17).  
Nestle also believed that the differences in the two approaches to food safety risk might 
have an additional political dimension (p. 21). She described, for example, the differences 
between how the U.S. government and the E.U. develop their food safety policies: the U.S. 
adopts the science-based approach, while the E.U. has been using the precautionary principle 
approach (Nestle, 2010, p. 21). Pascal Lamy, the Trade Commissioner of the European Union in 
1999, said that "[i]n the U.S. they believe that if no risks have been proven about a product, it 
should be allowed. In the EU we believe something should not be authorized if there is a chance 
of risk" (quoted in Charnovitz, 2000, p. 295, n.181). In the U.S, regulators decide which foods or 
ingredients are likely to cause harm and approve of the foods that are presumably safe. 
According to Nestle, this approach is used by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for 
food additives characterized as “generally recognized as safe” with some modification for 
genetically engineered foods. This approach does not require pre-market testing or labeling but 
requires the producers to show “reasonable certainty of no harm,” which then translates as an 
arguably subjective perception of “safe enough to be acceptable” (p. 21). The E.U., on the other 
hand, applies the precautionary principle, which requires foods to be deemed as safe before they 
can be distributed or marketed. The precautionary principle is sometimes seen as “too restrictive” 
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from a commercial vantage point, but it is welcomed by other parties, such as environmental 
advocates or opponents of food biotechnology (Nestle, 2010, p. 22). 
I.4. Harmonization of International Food Safety Standards 
The WTO promotes the global harmonization of SPS measures including food safety 
standards, as described in article 3 of the SPS Agreement: “[T]o harmonize sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they 
exist” (WTO, 1995). Khanna and Saxena (2003) argued that since other factors such as social, 
economic, and cultural aspects will affect the choice of food and the level of risk that people are 
willing to take, the Codex standard should include the broader socio-cultural factors that embody 
consumers’ attitudes to foods in addition to its sound scientific basis. Other issues, including 
environmental and animal welfare, may fall between the responsibility of the “three sisters”: the 
CAC for human health, the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health, and 
the World Organization for Animal Health/ Office International des Epizooties (OIE) (WTO, n.d.).  
FAO/WHO (2006) emphasized the importance of the harmonization of food standards 
because it is “generally viewed as contributing to the protection of consumer health and the 
fullest possible facilitation of international trade” (p. xxviii). As mentioned in the 2004 
FAO/WHO Global Forum of Food Safety Regulators, “The Codex system provides an important 
opportunity for countries to work together to develop international standards in a representative 
manner. … Developing countries would benefit from greater use of basic Codex texts when 
building their food control systems” (FAO/WHO, 2006). Meanwhile, Veggeland and Borgen 
(2005), in line with Victor (2011) and Vogel (1995), argued that “the WTO has “politicized” the 
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Codex” (p. 701). The role, position, and perception of the CAC have shifted after being referred 
to by the WTO as the “central reference point for the elaboration of international food standards” 
(Veggeland & Borgen, 2005, p. 675). Veggeland and Borgen (2005) explained that the 1995 SPS 
agreement created a semi-binding effect on governments, a shift from the previous voluntary 
nature of the Codex (p. 683). The semi-binding nature of the Codex after 1995 was captured by a 
comment from a European Commission representative: 
In the past, if we disagreed with Codex Standards or Code of Practice, we could 
ignore it and take our own legislation. Now we can’t. If we decide to go beyond 
the Codex standards... we must demonstrate the scientific basis of our measure 
and how this measure complies with the level of protection fixed by the 
Codex committee… Experience shows that it is very difficult to do that (quoted in 
Veggeland & Borgen, 2005, p. 683). 
II. Human Rights and Food Safety 
Human rights were barely recognized in international law (Joseph, 2011) until the 
devastation of the Second World War pushed the international community to ensure such 
catastrophes would never be repeated. This provided the momentum to develop an international 
system of binding human rights protections (OHCHR, 2012). In 1945, the term “human rights” 
was first used in Article 45 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), where all members 
of the UN pledged to take action to achieve a “universal respect for and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and 
religion” (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2008). On December 10, 1948, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly (OHCHR, 2012). The 
UDHR set a general prohibition of discrimination (against race/color, sex, language, religion, 
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political affiliation, national/social origin, property, and birth, among other distinctions) and 
enumerated more than thirty specific group rights that member states are bound to promote and 
protect (OHCHR, 2012).  
The 1948 UDHR, however, is not a legally binding treaty (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 
2008). Instead, it aids in establishing a high moral force, representing the first internationally 
agreed upon definition of human rights (OHCHR, 2012) including economic, social and cultural 
rights, which include the right to adequate food. The UHDR also set the groundwork for the 
treaty structure that developed in the following decades, as can be seen in Figure 2. By 
comprehensively pulling together different types of rights, the UHDR emphasizes “the 
commonality, interrelatedness, and interdependence of all rights, a fundamental point reaffirmed 
later in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights” (OHCR, 2012). 
The struggle to develop the UHDR into legally binding conventions (Aaronson and 
Zimmerman, 2008), culminated in 1966 with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Both of these documents entered into force in 1976 (OHCHR, 2012). Together, the 
UHDR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR are often called “The International Bill of Rights” (Joseph, 
2011). The Covenants differ from the UDHR because the Covenants are legally binding to the 
member states that have accepted them by ratification or accession, while the Declaration applies 
universally to everyone, regardless of the state’s ratification status (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 
2008). 
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Figure 2. The United Nations human rights treaty system (OHCHR, 2012) 
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II.1. The human right to adequate food: locating food safety 
II.1.1. PANTHER Principles 
According to FAO (2011), the right to food sets up the PANTHER framework, a human 
rights-based approach (HRBA) to the right to adequate food, food security, and nutrition that 
should guide decision-making and implementation processes. Inventing from different human 
rights treaties, the seven principles of PANTHER that should be integrated in the work with the 
right to adequate food are: Participation, Accountability, Non-Discrimination, Transparency,  
Human dignity, Empowerment and Rule of law (FAO, 2011).  
Figure 3. Right to Adequate Food and Panther Principles (FAO, 2009, p.6) 
 
Of all of the PANTHER principles, the most relevant principles to this thesis are 
participation and non-discrimination (including equality). Diokno (2013) explained that 
participation is “the direct control, ownership, and management by the people of public decision 
making” (p.3). Participation is inclusive and must be voluntary, recognized by law, free or not 
subject to sanction or threat and active (IAP2, 2007). The UN OHCHR (2003) stated four stages 
of participation in policy-making related to poverty reduction strategies: preference revelation; 
policy choice; implementation; and monitoring, assessment and accountability. According to 
UNDP/CSOPP (1197), there are 9 levels or degrees of participation: manipulation (non-
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participation); information; consultation; consensus-building; decision-making; risk-sharing; 
partnership; self-management (the “pinnacle” of participation). Furthermore, Diokno (2013) 
described nondiscrimination as: 
[T]he entitlement to all human rights without distinction of any kind, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, color, ethnic origin, sex, gender stereotypes, 
prejudices and expected roles, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, descent, inherited social status, property, birth, disability, age, nationality, 
marital and family status, sexual orientation and gender identity, health status, place of 
residency, economic and social situation and membership in group (p.11). 
while equality ensures that women and men enjoy all human rights on an even, like or same basis 
(p. 12).  
Table 2. PANTHER principles (Bellows, Núñez, de Lara, & Viana, 2017, pp. 28-30) 
Participation 
The public sector must conduct: 
• Active encouragement of people to organize and to genuinely, freely, actively participate in 
decision-making 
• Outreach to, and inclusion of, those most affected by public decisions into the decision-
making 
• Mandated incorporation of people’s views (voluntary, legally recognized, free) in all public 
decisions and actions 
• Formal mechanisms for claim holders and other actors to question policies, bring complaints, 
demand compensation/restitution, hold governments, and through them non-state actors, 
accountable 
• Involvement of people in the monitoring of public policy implementation 
Non-discrimination (focus on marginalized and excluded groups) 
The public sector must guarantee: 
• The enjoyment of all human rights without distinction of any kind, exclusion, restriction, or 
preference based on race, color, ethnic origin, sex, gender stereotypes, prejudices and 
expected roles, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
descent, inherited social status, property, birth, disability, age, nationality, marital and family 
status, sexual orientation and gender identity, health status, place of residency, economic and 
social situation, and membership in group. 
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Adopting Diokno (2013), Bellows, Núñez, de Lara, and Viana (2017) described the 
expectation of public sector in the context of the HRBA in Table 2. Participation and non 
discrimination principles are essential to achieve the right to adequate food. Based on the country 
visits and questionnaire review during the evaluation of the Codex Allimentarius Commission 
(CAC) in 20025, FAO/WHO reported that: 
[D]eveloping countries feel unable to participate as effectively as they would wish in 
Codex, and developing country participation is recognized as a problem too, by 
developed and middle-income countries. Overall, 78% of respondents scored below the 
mid-point for the balance in involvement and influence of poorer countries in Codex. 
Ninety six percent of low-income countries and 87% of middle-income countries do not 
participate in Codex to the extent they think desirable, the overwhelming reason given 
being lack of financial resources (FAO/WHO, 2002, p. 14).  
The WHO has been developing Codex Trust Fund (CTF) to foster effective participation in 
Codex, including support for meeting attendance (FAO/WHO, 2002, p.7). According to 
FAO/WHO (2018), in 2004 – 2015, CTF supported over 2300 participants from developing and 
less-developed countries to participate in the development of Codex standard-setting and offered 
FAO/WHO Codex training to more than 1200 people to increase the effectiveness of their 
participation in the Codex Alimentarius Commission (FAO/WHO, 2018). FAO and WHO 
expressed their satisfaction with the results of the final evaluation of the first Codex Trust Fund 
                                                          
5 Newer reference is not available. 
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(2003-2015), although they noted the limited evidence from the evaluation on the real impact of 
Codex Trust Fund activities at country level due to several factor as follows:  
(T)he difficulty in attributing changes at country level to CTF (rather than as a result of 
other interventions by FAO, WHO, other bilateral or multilateral actors and/or as a result 
of all these interventions taken together) and; the lack of baselines at country level 
against which to measure change (FAO/WHO, 2015).  
In January 2016, following the success of the first CTF, FAO and WHO started a second Codex 
Trust Fund/CTF2 (FAO/WHO, 2018). Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Senegal became the 
first countries who received the Codex Trust Fund for three years in 2016. In 2018, ten countries: 
Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Republic of Macedonia, Guinea, Honduras, India, Mali, 
Nepal and Rwanda are the identified countries to be supported in the second round (WHO, 
2018).  
II.1.2. Right to Adequate food 
The right to food is recognized in the 1948 UHDR as part of the right to an adequate 
standard of living: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, ...” (art. 25). It is elaborated in the 1966 
ICESCR: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions” (OHCHR, 2002, art. 11). The 
notion of adequacy introduced by UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights/CESCR (1999) as particularly significant to the right to food because it lays out several 
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factors that must be considered in deciding whether particular foods or diets are genuinely 
accessible and available according to diverse lived circumstances.  
In response to the result of the FAO World Food Summit in 1996, the CESCR issued its 
general comment No. 12 (1999), which expands the minimally introduced legal right of 1966 and 
defines the right to food, including attention to food safety. Eight years later, FAO established 
the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food 
in the Context of National Food Security (2005) as practical guidance to States in their 
implementation of the right to adequate food (OHCHR, 2002). The Right to Food Guidelines 
addresses both States parties and non-States parties to the ICESCR regardless of how developed 
a country is and encourages the state to use the guidelines for drafting their national strategies 
and programs to fight hunger and malnutrition (OHCHR, 2002). 
The right to adequate (including safe) food is explained by the CESCR (1999) in General 
Comment 12, Paragraph 8: 
The core content of the right to adequate food stipulates:  
The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of 
individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture;  
The accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with 
the enjoyment of other human rights” (ICESCR GC 12, 1999, para. 8). 
The aspect of food safety is clarified further in Paragraph 10: 
[F]ree from adverse substances sets requirements for food safety and for a range of 
protective measures by both public and private means to prevent contamination of 
foodstuffs through adulteration and/or through bad environmental hygiene or 
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inappropriate handling at different stages throughout the food chain; care must also be 
taken to identify and avoid or destroy naturally occurring toxins (ICESCR GC 12, 1999, 
para. 10). 
Adequate access to safe and nutritious foods is an essential part of human right to adequate food, 
therefore states have the obligation to ensure a progressive realization of the right to adequate 
(including safe) food. 
II.2. Right to Adequate Food and Trade 
Joseph (2011), in her book, Blame it on the WTO, pointed out the concern that “SPS 
measures can set up a clash with human rights interests” (p. 120). She argued that despite the 
positive impact of the SPS Agreement on the right to health (art. 12 of the 1966 ICESCR), the 
agreement can cause a highly problematic issue for developing countries, since SPS measures 
can interfere with the right to development (art 1 of the 1966 ICCPR), especially for farmers 
(Joseph, 2011). Since most of poorest people in the world depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood, SPS measures can create serious trade barriers, which threaten their livelihoods and 
hinder the ability of agricultural workers to overcome poverty in their own countries (Joseph, 
2011, p. 125). For example, she explained that the aflatoxins standards imposed by the EU (2 
ppb for Aflatoxin B1), which are higher than the international (Codex) standards, have been 
reducing the potential export of nuts and grains from Africa to the EU (p. 125). 
Aflatoxins are toxic for humans and animals, with Aflatoxin B1 being the most toxic. At 
high doses, aflatoxin can cause acute poisoning and death in both humans and animals, and at 
chronic lower-level doses, it causes liver cancer, immunomodulation, stunting, and kwashiorkor 
in young children (Okoth, 2016, p. 56). Compared to the Codex standard for Aflatoxin B1 
(approximately 9 ppb), Otsuki, Wilson, & Sewadeh (2001) estimated that the stringent EU 
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standard could decrease the African export by 64 percent or US$ 670 million per year (p.1). 
Joseph (2011) argued that this trading loss creates significant human rights issues regarding the 
right to work (art. 6 of the 1966 ICESCR) and the right to an adequate standard of living (art. 11 
of the 1966 ICESCR) for African people (Joseph, 2011, p. 125). On the other hand, she also 
points out that, as reported by Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh, the EU standard would reduce 
health risk from aflatoxins by 1.4 deaths per billion per annum.  
This case shows the “difficult conundrum from a human rights point of view” (Joseph, 
2011, p.125). Joseph articulated the dilemma as follows: 
Should Europe be required to lower its SPS standard and jeopardize the lives of 1.4 
people per billion in order to safeguard the livelihoods and the rights of those dependent 
on the nut and grain export industry? .... Is the subjection of a person to such a low risk a 
breach of the right to life?” (Joseph, 2011, p. 125).  
A human rights approach can be applied to both importing and exporting countries. Wealthy 
importing countries, like those from the EU, have an obligation to protect the public from 
aflatoxins. However, implementing a stringent standard without providing the capacity building 
to help poor exporting countries (i.e., African countries) meet this same high standard may 
hamper the right to life of African people. 
 It is also essential, on the other hand, to implement an adequate standard for aflatoxins in 
Africa. The newest report by Okoth (2016) showed that contamination levels of aflatoxins in 
foods and feeds in Africa exceed internationally acceptable levels, with reported aflatoxin levels 
as high as 138,000 ppb in pre-harvest maize samples in Nigeria and 48,000 ppb in their stored 
maize (p. 56). The high level of aflatoxins has caused the death of humans and animals in Kenya, 
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Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda due to its toxic presence in human organs, while 
liver cancer causes about 26,000 deaths annually in sub-Saharan Africa (Okoth, 2016, p. 56). 
A study by Folleti and Shingal (2014) showed that stricter food safety regulations could 
create economic benefits for the exporting country. They asserted that stricter food safety 
standards create an incentive for farmers in the exporting countries to improve their agricultural 
practices and increase the value of exports as a result of higher quality products. Foletti and 
Shingal found that “… greater difference of MRLs between trading partners increases the value 
of exports when the exporters have to comply with stricter regulations in their domestic market. 
Thus, a stringency in exporter market is positively correlated with the value of export” (Folleti & 
Shingal, 2014, p. 15). Arguably, developed countries with more established food safety standards 
achieve an advantage by setting higher food safety standards. They can provide higher protection 
for their people, regulate (protect) their trade by creating indirect trade barriers to limit imports, 
and increase the value of their exports.  
II.3. Right to Adequate Food, Food Sovereignty, Food Self-Sufficiency, Food Security and 
Food Safety in Indonesia 
According to Safa’at (2013), the concept of human rights to food is unpopular in 
Indonesia due to limited understanding of human rights concepts (p. 104). Human rights in 
Indonesia are usually only part of a discourse associated with violence that has claimed 
people lives, restrictions on the right to form a union or freedom of speech, or the state’s 
repression of people (Safa’at, 2013, p. 104). Almost no human rights or other civil society 
organization activists, including the (Indonesia) National Commission on Human Rights, 
has brought up hunger and malnutrition issues as a violation to human rights (Khudori, 2005 
as cited in Safa’at, 2013). This narrow understanding of human rights affected the drafting 
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of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, which does not explicitly include the human right to 
food (Safa’at, 2013).  
In 1999, Indonesia stipulated the Human Right Laws Number 39 that defines human 
rights as follows: 
… a set of rights bestowed by God Almighty in essence and being of humans as creations 
of God which must be respected, held in the highest esteem, and protected by the state, 
law, Government, and all people to protect human dignity and worth (Hadipriyatno, 
2010). 
Hadipriyatno (2010) argued that the Human Rights Laws in Indonesia have adopted the 
equality and non -discrimination principle, but not the principle of self-determination. She 
added that the concept of human responsibilities is recognized and defined in Article 2 of 
the Human Rights Law which requires everyone to be personally responsible for upholding 
equality and self-determination; the Human Rights Law does not frame Indonesian people’s 
right to address human rights violations to public sector duty-bearers. The right to food is 
implicitly addressed in Article 9 of the 1999 Law, paragraph 1: “(1) Everyone has the right 
to life, to sustain life, and to improve his or her standard of living.” This can be understood 
to be parallel to the UDHR paragraph 21 which references the adequate standard of living, 
which includes, among others, the entitlement to food (Hadipriyatno, 2010, p.4). 
The range of human rights protections in the 1945 Constitution was broadened 
during the fourth amendment in 2002, where the entire article 28 (A-J) is devoted solely to 
fundamental human rights (Hadipriyatno, 2010). Although the right to food was not 
explicitly stated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, according to FAO 
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(n.d) the implicit protection of the right to adequate food can be inferred from Article 28C 
Paragraph 1 and Article 28H Paragraph 1 and 3: 
Article 28C:  
“(1) Every person has the right to self-realization through the fulfillment of his basic 
needs, the right to education and to partake in the benefits of science and technology, art 
and culture, to improve the quality of his life and the well-being of mankind”. 
Article 28H:  
“(1) Each person has a right to a life of well-being in body and mind, to a place to dwell, 
to enjoy a good and healthy environment, and to receive medical care.  
(3) Each person is entitled to social security enabling him to develop his entire self-
unimpaired as a dignified human being.” (FAO in The Right to Food around the Globe, 
n,d.)  
Hadipriyatno (2010) and Safa’at (2013) consider the right to food dimension to be also 
included in Article 27A Paragraph 2: “Each citizen shall be entitled to occupation and an 
existence proper for a human being,” as well as in Article 34 which guarantees the State’s 
protection for impoverished persons and abandoned children.” The 1945 Constitution, 
Article 33, also incorporates the state’s effective legal control over the land, water, and 
natural resources and the obligation to utilize it for the greatest benefit of Indonesia’s people 
(Limenta & Chandra, 2017). 
In 2005, Indonesia adopted and ratified both the ICESCR and ICCPR by Law 
Number 11 of 2005 and Law Number 12 of 2005. The country is therefore accountable to 
the treaties and subsequent related human right developments, including the right to food. 
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The Government of Indonesia recognized the right to adequate food through Food Law 18 
of 2012 which states that “food is the most essential human need, and its fulfillment is part 
of human rights that are guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as 
a basic component in creating quality human resources” (p. 1). The 2012 Food Law also 
emphasizes “the obligation of the state to achieve availability, affordability and fulfillment 
of food consumption that is sufficient, safe, excellent and nutritionally balance both on the 
national and local levels to individuals equally in entire territory of the Republic of 
Indonesia at all times utilizing local resources, institution and culture” (Indonesia Food Law 
of 2012, p.1). Therefore, Indonesia’s government has an obligation to ensure access to 
adequate and safe food for all its people. 
According to Surnaya and Khalil (2017), the 2012 Food Law was initiated by the House 
of Representatives and issued in 2012 to replace the previous 1996 Food Law because “it was 
considered to be incapable of providing guidance for solving problems and challenges of 
national food development.” As stated in the consideration part: “that Law Number 7 Year 1996 
on Food is no longer in line with the external and internal dynamic development conditions, 
democratization, decentralization, globalization, law enforcement and several regulatory 
legislations produced is then needed to be replaced.” (The 2012 Food Law, p.1). Surnaya and 
Khalil (2017) claimed that the process of drafting the 2012 Food Law involved not only 
representative parliamentary members and government representatives on a Working Committee 
coordinated by Ministry of Agriculture. The process also reflected, they argued, popular 
aspirations for food security, safety and justice through public consultations including food 
experts, academics, CSOs, and private sector actors (Surnaya and Khalil, 2017).   
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Surnaya and Khalil (2017) identified the three most significant differences between the 
2012 Food Law and the 1996 Food Law as follows: 
1. The concept of food security in the 1996 Food Law does not include the supply of food at the 
individual level but is more focused on the downstream aspects of the food system, such as 
regulations on food industries and processed food safety. Governance and control of the food 
supply and its affordability was not discussed. In the 2012 Food Law, these weaknesses are 
corrected so that the fulfillment of foods applies to the community, households, and 
individuals; 
2. The roles of regulation, sanctions, and law enforcement in the 1996 Food Law were still 
relatively weak, even though irregularities in food business are extremely dangerous for 
human health and political stability more generally. These aspects are arranged in more detail 
with relatively heavier sanctions in the 2012 Food Law; and 
3. The ratification of the 1966 ICESCR in 2005 brought legal consequences for Indonesia that 
resulted in the review of various instruments of national legislation to ensure that they were 
in accordance with the principles of progressive realization and protection of human rights. 
The ratification of the ICESCR had an immediate impact on diverse human rights in 
Indonesia, with particular regard to the right to food, which was re-formulated in the 2012 
Food Law according to the 1966 Covenant (Sunaya & Khali, 2017). 
However, Tisnanta, Firmansyah, & Evendia (2015) argued that one of the repercussions 
of becoming the WTO’s member and joining the Agreement of Agriculture (AoA) is trade 
liberalization specifially in agriculture. They mentioned that in 1995, Indonesia joined the WTO 
and started to implement the termination of agricultural inputs subsidies e.g. fertilizers, 
pesticides and seeds. Furthermore, as a WTO member, Indonesia has the obligation to follow all 
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the WTO’s policies, including its laws and regulations (Tisnanta, Firmansyah, & Evendia, 2015). 
Tisnanta, Firmansyah, & Evendia (2015) asserted that the provisions of the 2012 Food Law are 
arranged to accommodate the trade liberalization policies of the WTO in the food sector, which 
cause certain problems for Indonesia as a sovereign state. Meanwhile, Limenta & Candra (2017) 
contended that some articles in the 2012 Food Law, that emphasize food self-sufficiency, 
indicate the nationalistic and protective nature of Indonesia’s food import policy. Some 
consequences of this type of policy are creating trade disputes between Indonesia and its 
international trading partners and negatively affecting Indonesia’s domestic market (Limenta & 
Candara, 2017).  
In the 2012 Food Law, the food system is basically organized based on the principles of 
sovereignty, independence, security, safety, benefit, equality, sustainability, and equity (Rafani, 
2018). Rafani (2014) asserted that food sovereignty, food self-sufficiency, food security, and 
food safety, to some extent, are considered as the most essential principles (Rafani, 2014). The 
definition of those principles compared to international understanding is provided on Table 3. As 
can be seen from Table 3, the definition of food sovereignty and food security in the 2012 Food 
Law are parallel to the international one, while the definition of food self-
sufficiency/independence and food safety are different. 
Table 3. Definition of Four Main Principles in the 2012 Food Law  
Terminology The 2012 Food Law International  
Food 
Sovereignty 
The right of the state and nation 
to independently establish food 
policy that guarantees the right 
to food for the people and to 
grant the right to the society to 
establish a food system that is 
appropriate to the available local 
potential resources (Indonesia’s 
Food Law, 2012) 
The right of people to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food produced through ecologically 
sound and sustainable methods, and their right to 
define their own food and agriculture systems. It 
puts the aspirations and needs of those who 
produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of 
food systems and policies rather than the demands 
of markets and corporations.” (Declaration of 
Nyéléni, 2007) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Terminology The 2012 Food Law International 
Food Self-
Sufficiency 
(Food 
Independence) 
The ability of the state and nation in 
producing (to produce) various foods 
domestically that can guarantee the 
sufficient fulfillment of food 
demand that sufficiently reach 
individual needs using local available 
potential natural, human, social, 
economic resources, and local 
wisdom with dignity (Indonesia’s 
Food Law, 2012). 
The concept of food self-sufficiency is 
generally taken to mean the extent to which a 
country can satisfy its food needs from its 
own domestic production (FAO, 1999). 
Food Security The fulfillment of food for the state 
up to the individuals, that is reflected 
by food availability that is sufficient, 
both in quantity and quality, and 
safe, diverse, nutritious, prevalent 
and affordable as well as not 
conflicting with religion, belief and 
culture, to live healthy, active and 
productive in a sustainable manner 
(Indonesia’s Food Law, 2012). 
Food security exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
which meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life 
(World Food Summit, 1996). 
 
Food Safety A condition and effort that is 
required to prevent food from the 
possibility of biological, chemical 
and other pollution that can interfere, 
harm and endanger human health as 
well as not to conflict with religion, 
belief, and culture of the society so 
that it is safe for consumption 
(Indonesia’s Food Law, 2012). 
Food safety implies the absence or safe levels 
of contaminants, bacteria, naturally occurring 
toxins or any other substance that may make 
food injurious to health (FAO, 2018). 
 
Indonesia’s definition for food self-sufficiency is unique, compared to the brief 
explanation from the FAO. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development/OECD (2015), the term of “Kemandirian Pangan” in the 2012 Food Law is 
frequently translated into “food independence”, “food self-reliance”, or “food self-sufficiency”, 
which creates confusion (p. 61). Rafani (2014) argues that the phrase “food independence” is 
related to food self-sufficiency and food resilience, semantically (p. 2). Yet, he claimed that 
“kemandirian pangan” in the 2012 Food Law means “food independence” not “self-sufficiency”, 
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and it might be because national? independence is understood as the most important aspect of 
kemandirian pangan and it also has incorporated self-sufficiency concept (p.6). He added that 
“independence” might be understood as one hundred percent food self-sufficiency requiring zero 
food imports: 
The word “independence” entails the ability of the state and nation to produce its 
own food diversity by utilizing the potential of natural resources in the country. 
This definition must be interpreted alertly since it may lead to the interpretation that 
Indonesia should produce its own food while import indicates the failure of the 
state, which should be restricted or prohibited (Rafani, 2014, p.2).  
  
 The definition of food security in the 2012 Food law is in line with the FAO’s definition, 
and an enriched concept of food sovereignty in the first food law, the Food Law Number 7 of 
1996. It includes the fulfilment of food up to individual level, and also incorporates respect for 
religious and other beliefs, in addition to cultural aspects of food (Rafani, 2014). Compared to 
the FAO’s definition, Indonesia has a more elaborate definition for and a wider scope of 
attention to food safety because it includes the requirements that food must be free from 
substances that might conflict with religion, belief systems, and culture in Indonesia. As the most 
populous Muslim country in the world, halal is an integrated part of food safety in Indonesia 
(Sparringga & Puspitasari, 2015). 
III. The Case Study of Indonesia: Food Safety Control Mechanism for Fresh Plant 
Products at the Border  
 
The globalization of food trade has increased the challenge for national food control 
authorities to provide consumers adequate protection and to ensure all circulated foods are safe, 
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wholesome, and fit for human consumption. FAO-WHO (1998), in Assuring Food Safety and 
Quality Guidelines for Strengthening National Food Control System, states: 
The challenges for food control authorities include increasing the burden of food-borne 
illness and new and emerging foodborne hazards; rapidly changing technologies in food 
production, processing and marketing; developing science-based food control systems with 
a focus on consumer protection; international food trade and need for harmonization of 
food safety and quality standards; changes in lifestyles, including rapid urbanization; and 
growing consumer awareness of food safety and quality issues and increasing demand for 
better information (FAO/WHO, 1998, p. 2).  
The Republic of Indonesia, located in Southeast Asia, is the world’s largest archipelago 
country and the fourth most populous country in the world with a population of 262 million 
(Focus Economic, 2018). In 2016, Indonesia exported $380 billion worth of total goods and 
became the 28th largest export economy in the world with GDP $932 billion and GDP per capita 
$11.6k (OEC, n.d.). The most recent reports by the Observatory of Economic Complex/OEC 
showed that the top exported products from Indonesia are coal briquettes, palm oil, and 
petroleum gas, and the top imports are refined petroleum, crude petroleum, and telephones. 
According to the Ministry of Trade/MoT (2018), the top ten main export commodities in 
Indonesia are textiles, electronics, rubber, palm oil, forestry products, footwear, automotive, 
shrimp, cocoa, and coffee. The most significant export destination countries for Indonesia are 
the USA, Japan, China, Malaysia, and the EU (MoT, 2018). A report from MoA in 2015 
showed that the top imported fresh agri-foods in Indonesia are milk, beef (live cows), wheat 
grain, soybean, rice garlic, corn, apple, grapes, oranges, and peanut (p.5). The biggest importer 
 
43 
 
countries are the USA, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Thailand, New Zealand, 
Canada, and Vietnam (MoA, 2015, p.10) 
Figure 4. Indonesian Map (Google, 2018) 
 
 Indonesia defines food sovereignty in its food law as “the right of the state and nation that 
independently establish food policy that guarantees the right to food for the people and grant the 
right for the society to establish a food system that is appropriate for the potential local 
resources” (Indonesia Food Law of 2012, p.2). This Food Law has been used as the basis for 
developing technical regulations regarding food, including food safety. Furthermore, as a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Indonesia must follow the international trade 
agreement related to food trade, such as Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). These measures allow members to take scientifically based 
measures to protect public health. Nevertheless, the same measures might prevent developing 
countries like Indonesia from protecting their public health due to the limited resources that can 
hinder the ability to establish appropriate scientific justification as required by the WTO. Table 4 
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below shows the dynamic transformation of food safety regulations for importation of fresh agri-
foods in Indonesia. 
Table 4. Food safety regimes and regulations for importation of agri-fresh products in Indonesia 
Food 
Safety  
Regimes 
Title of 
Regulation 
Enforcement 
Period 
 
Regulated Objects 
 
Main Changes 
R
E
G
IM
E
 1
 
MoA Regulation 
No. 27 of 2009 
jo. MoA 
Regulation No.  
38 of 2009 
May 2009 – 18 
March 2012 
38 types of fresh Agri-
foods 
Chemical Contaminant 
(Pesticide Residue, Heavy 
Metals, dan Mycotoxin) 
- 
MoA Regulation  
No.  88 of 2011  
19 March 2012 
– 16 February 
2015 
100 types of fresh Agri-
foods 
Chemical Contaminant 
(Pesticide Residue, Heavy 
Metals, dan Mycotoxin), 
Biological Contaminant 
and Formalin. 
- Adding new fresh Agri-
foods 
- Updating the food safety 
standards with the Newest 
Codex Standards 
R
E
G
IM
E
 2
 
MoA Regulation   
No. 04 of 2015 
17 February – 
12 April 2016 
103 types of fresh Agri-
foods 
Chemical Contaminant 
(Pesticide Residue, Heavy 
Metals, dan Mycotoxin) 
and Biological 
Contaminant. 
- Adding new fresh Agri-
foods 
- Updating the food safety 
standards with the Newest 
Codex Standards 
- Renewing the food safety 
control mechanism (“more 
stringent”) 
MoA Regulation   
No. 13 of 2016 
 
13 April 2016 - 
17 November 
2016 
103 types of fresh Agri-
foods 
Chemical Contaminant 
(Pesticide Residue, Heavy 
Metals, dan Mycotoxin) 
and Biological 
Contaminant. 
- Amending several 
administrative provisions 
- Postponing the enforcement 
for specific requirements. 
R
E
G
IM
E
 3
 
MoA Regulation   
No. 5 of 2016 
 
18 November 
2016 - Now 
100 types of fresh Agri-
foods 
Chemical Contaminant 
(Pesticide Residue, Heavy 
Metals, dan Mycotoxin) 
and Biological 
Contaminant. 
- Deleting cacao beans, dates, 
and olives from Annex I. 
- Updating the Food safety 
standards with Newest 
Codex Standard 
- Adding a “less stringent” 
mechanism for food safety 
inspection. 
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In seven years, food safety regulation has been revised and amended five times, and the 
last three adjustments occurred in less than a year. The alterations were carried out because of 
demands from several stakeholders including exporters, importers, the government of exporting 
countries, Indonesia’s food industries, and public sectors. The Indonesian Agriculture Quarantine 
Agency (IAQA) is the national border authority under the Ministry of Agriculture that has been 
conducting the food safety inspection of imported fresh plant products since 2009. The types of 
food that are regulated are called “fresh food of plant origin (FFPO)” and defined as 
“unprocessed food of plant origin which can be directly consumed, processed minimally, and/or 
can be used as raw material in the food processing” (MoA Regulation 27 0f 2009, Art. 1). As can 
be seen in Figure 5 below, three regimes characterize the five regulations that frame the 
mechanism for food safety control at the border.  
Figure 5. The food safety regulations on the import of fresh plant products 
 
The first regime, Regime 1, provides four mechanisms for exporting countries to export their 
products to Indonesia: (A) Recognition of food safety system of origin country; (B) Equivalence 
Agreement of food safety system between Indonesia and exporting country; (C) Recognition of 
food safety system of production sites in exporting country; and (D) Regular Inspection: food 
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safety inspection for every consignment (regular inspection) at entry port in Indonesia (MoA 
Regulation 27 0f 2009, art. 4; MoA Regulation 88 0f 2011, art. 5). In the second regime, Regime 
2, the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 04 of 2015 offers limited options with 
only two mechanisms: (1) Recognition of food safety system of origin country and (2) Registration 
of food safety testing laboratory/ies in exporting country (MoA Regulation 04 of 2015, art. 5, 6 & 
20). In the last regime, Regime 3, another mechanism is added to accommodate exporting countries 
without recognition or registered laboratory (MoA Regulation 55 of 2016, Art. 7-9). It also 
excludes cacao, olives, and dates from the list of regulated FFPO to facilitate industry and reduce 
the inspection objects to 100 types of produce. 
III.1. REGIME 1 
 Regime 1 started with the implementation of the Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 27 of 2009 in conjunction with the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture 
Number 38 of 2009 and the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011 with 
38 FFPO as the inspection objects. Both regulations have the same provisions for food safety 
inspection which importing countries should follow at least one particular mechanism as follows: 
R1-Mechanism A Recognition of food safety system of origin (exporting) country; 
R1-Mechanism B Equivalence Agreement of food safety system between Indonesia and 
exporting country; 
R1-Mechanism C Recognition of food safety system of production sites in exporting 
country; and   
R1-Mechanism D Regular Inspection: food safety inspection for every consignment 
(regular inspection) at entry ports in Indonesia (MoA Regulation 27 of 2009, art. 4; MoA 
Regulation 88 of 2011, art. 5). 
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These mechanisms were adopted from Codex Guidelines for Food Import Control 
System CAC/GL 47-2003. Codex (2003) advised importing countries to provide a mechanism to 
recognize food control system applied by an exporting country’s competent authority, including 
using an equivalence agreement or mutual recognition agreement (Art. 13). Accordingly, R1-
Mechanism A, recognition of food safety system of origin country, means Indonesia’s 
government will recognize food safety control systems in exporting countries if their systems 
achieve at least the same level of protection required by Indonesia’s government (Codex, 2003, 
Art. 32).  The second mechanism, R1-Mechanism B, followed the Codex Guidelines CAC/GL 
34-1999, which defined equivalence as “the capability of different inspection and certification 
systems to meet the same objectives” (Codex, 1999). R1-Mechanism C, recognition of food 
safety system of production sites in exporting country, is similar to Mechanism A, but with a 
smaller scope which Indonesia’s government will recognize food safety system of production 
sites for specific commodities in an exporting country. The last mechanism, R1-Mechanism D, 
was developed for exporting countries without Indonesia’s recognition or equivalence (MoA 
Regulation 27 0f 2009, art. 15; MoA Regulation 88 0f 2011, Art. 5). 
In general, food safety control at the border for fresh food in Indonesia consists of three 
types of inspections: (i) document inspection; (ii) physical inspection; and (iii) sampling and 
laboratory testing. Document inspection is conducted to ensure all required documents are valid 
and complete. Physical inspection is conducted to verify the information on the documents 
conform to the produce and the information on the produce. The main difference for countries 
that follow R1-Mechanism D, is that every exportation from these exporting countries would 
undergo food safety laboratory testing at the border in Indonesia, regardless of whether or not 
they have been tested prior to exportation. Meanwhile, for other countries that follow R1-
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Mechanisms (A), (B), or (C), the regular inspections are limited to document and physical 
inspection (MoA Regulation 27 0f 2009, art. 18-21; MoA Regulation 88 0f 2011, art 13-15). 
Sampling and laboratory testing was conducted randomly and for monitoring purposes only 
(irregularly) (MoA Regulation 27 of 2009, art. 20; MoA Regulation 88 of 2011, art 7-12).  
Under Regime 1 and the provision of R1-Mechanism A, only four countries were 
recognized for their food safety control system (i.e., The United States, Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand), although more than 60 countries were exporting their fresh plant products to 
Indonesia (MoA, 2018). Produce from all other countries without recognition or the equivalence 
agreement (R1-Mechanism D) were being regularly inspected, sampled, and tested each time 
they were exported to Indonesia (MoA Regulation 27 of 2009, art. 25-29; MoA Regulation 88 of 
2011, art 7-9). Fees for laboratory testing will be charged to the importer (MoA Regulation 27 of 
2009, art. 27; MoA Regulation 88 of 2011, art 9). The produce shall be accompanied by a Food 
Safety Certificate issued by the Food Safety Authority or the Accredited Laboratory in the 
exporting country (MoA Regulation 88 of 2011, art 7). Therefore, there might be a testing 
redundancy under Mechanism D since the produce probably was tested prior to export to 
Indonesia. Because of the increasing demand for a more effective and efficient mechanism to 
control the food safety of agri-food products at the border (MoA Regulation 88 of 2011, 
Consideration), the IAQA conducted a technical assessment to modernize its food safety 
inspection model in 2014. The assessment was then used as the scientific justification to revise 
the regulation into Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 04 of 2015. This regulation 
made significant changes to provisions for food safety control for imported fresh Agri-foods with 
the objective of strengthening the food safety system in Indonesia. 
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III.2. REGIME 2 
Regime 2 began with the implementation of the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture 
Number 04 of 2015 on February 17, 2015. The new Regime 2 regulation was aimed at reducing 
the burden of regular samplings and laboratory testing at the border and shortening the port 
dwelling time (the time cargo/containers spends within the port or its extension). The required 
laboratory testing remained a continuing challenge. All four private laboratories with the 
capacity and competency to conduct the testing for quarantine purposes and that can comply with 
the time limit (2-4 days testing time) are located on Java Island, particularly in Jakarta, West 
Java, and East Java provinces. There are fifty quarantine stations around Indonesia; thus, 
shipping the samples from quarantine stations outside Java Island to laboratories on Java Island 
is time-consuming and incurs additional costs.  
It is difficult, moreover, to maintain the sample’s condition during the shipping which 
can affect the sample’s quality and the testing results, notably for microbial contaminants and 
mycotoxins. Bacteria like E. coli and Salmonella are susceptible to temperature; higher 
temperature can kill them whereas they will proliferate under favorable temperatures. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization/FAO (1997) recommended that samples for microbiological 
analysis should be refrigerated in ice at 0-4°C and transported in a sample chest with a suitable 
refrigerant capable of maintaining the sample at 0-4°C until arrival at the laboratory. The 
refrigerated samples should not be analyzed more than 36 hours after collection (FAO, 1997, 
p.3). Therefore, samples for microbial and mycotoxin testing must be kept at a specific 
temperature to obtain a valid and reliable testing result. A valid laboratory testing result is critical 
because the quarantine inspectors rely on those results to determine whether a shipment will be 
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allowed to enter Indonesia. Hence, a more effective and efficient food safety inspection is 
required to improve and strengthen the food safety inspection system at the border. 
The scope of inspection under Regime 2 included 103 commodities consisting of fruits, 
vegetables, grains, nuts, lentils, and estate crops (MoA Regulation 04 of 2015, Annex I). 
Additionally, the MRLs standards for pesticide residues was updated following the Codex 
Standards of 2014. Generally, there was no significant change for other standards such as heavy 
metals, mycotoxins, and microbial contaminants since there it was still referring to the 2014 
Codex Standard and the same Indonesian National Standards. 
Provisions for food safety inspection at the border under Regime 2 were simplified from 
four mechanisms to only two mechanisms:  
R2-Mechanism A Recognition of the food safety control system of origin country; and 
R2-Mechanism B Registration of food safety testing laboratory/is in the exporting country 
(MoA Regulation 04 of 2015, art. 5, 6 & 20) 
R2-Mechanism A in Regime 2 is the same mechanism as R1-Mechanism A in Regime 1, while 
R1-Mechanism B, C, and D were removed, and R2-Mechanism 2 was added. R2-Mechanism B 
was established to shift the food safety inspection (sampling and laboratory testing) from at-the-
border to pre-border. The recognized laboratories in the exporting country are responsible for 
guaranteeing that products that have been tested are safe for human consumption before 
exportation (MoA Regulation 04 of 2015, Art. 6). Therefore, there is no need for a regular 
inspection at the border in Indonesia, and the food safety control was  conducted through 
monitoring based on risk analysis. 
R1-Mechanism D was removed as an effort to push the exporting countries to apply for 
recognition or registration mechanisms. During the previous Regime, the traditional food safety 
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control was focused on regular sampling and testing of imported products to determine their 
compliance with Indonesia’s food safety standard. Regime 2 tried to shift to a modern food 
safety conception which focused on more “preventive” actions than “reactive” actions by using 
risk-based approaches to food control and requiring that all operators in the food supply chain 
share responsibility for food safety. The aim was to strengthen consumer protection from 
hazardous food and provide a more accurate approach to food safety control particularly in 
entry/exit points which utilized a risk-based inspection method. Random inspection as part of the 
monitoring program would be conducted irregularly based on the food safety risk level. It was 
expected to effectively reduce the dwelling-time in the ports while ensuring safe food supplies 
for consumers in Indonesia. The Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 04 of 2015 
can be considered as the most restrictive regulation since only countries with recognition, or 
recognized laboratories could export their fresh plant products to Indonesia (Indreswari, 2016). A 
grace period of one year was given to provide adequate time for food safety authorities in the 
exporting countries to prepare all necessary actions needed to comply with Indonesia’s 
regulation (MoA Regulation 13 of 2016).  
The Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 04 of 2015 was revised within two 
months of its enforcement. Even though a one-year transitional period had been arranged to ensure 
a smooth and successful implementation, contrary reactions from different parties were inevitable. 
The Regulation was strongly challenged by many stakeholders, including the governments of 
exporting countries and exporters, Indonesia’s importers and food industries (Aziliya, 2016), and 
even other Indonesian government agencies. They argued that the new mechanism might cause an 
unnecessary import barrier and disturb the trade and economic relationships between Indonesia 
and exporting countries. In addition, some food industries claimed that the restriction would 
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disturb their raw materials supply and affect their businesses which may later cause job loss. The 
industry mostly imported cacao from African countries such as Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire that did 
not have any competent laboratories to conduct the food safety testing (Aziliya, 2016). On April 
13, 2016, the regulation was amended barely two months after its enforcement date into Regulation 
of the Minister of Agriculture Number 13 of 2016. Since the Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture Number 13 of 2016 still deemed the amendment “too restrictive,” it was superseded 
by a “less stringent regulation,” (Aziliya, 2016) which marked the beginning of the Regime 3. 
III.3. REGIME 3 
In this newest Regime, Regime 3, another mechanism was added to accommodate 
exporting countries without recognition or registered laboratories. It also excluded cacao, olives, 
and dates from the list of regulated fresh agri-food products. Cacao was removed to facilitate the 
outcry from a domestic industry that relies on the imported raw material. There are three provisions 
for food safety inspection under Regime 3 as follows: 
R3-Mechanism A Recognition of the food safety control system of origin country;  
R3-Mechanism B Registration of food safety testing laboratory/is in the exporting country; 
R3-Mechanism C Non-recognition/registration: Food safety inspection of FFPO importation 
from countries with a non-recognized food safety control system and a non-registered laboratory 
(MoA Regulation 55 of 2016, Art. 7-9). 
With the addition of R3-Mechanism C, Regime 3 has less restrictive requirements since 
every country can export their products to Indonesia without undergoing regular sampling and 
testing (MoA Regulation 55 of 2016, Art. 51). Unlike Regime 1, the new mechanism, R3-
Mechanism C, allows any product to enter as long as it is accompanied by the required document: 
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a food safety certificate, as a guarantee from the exporter or government in the exporting country 
that the food is safe for human consumption (MoA Regulation 55 of 2016, Art. 9). Considering 
that there is no standard food safety certificate available, this may weaken consumer protections 
against hazardous imported foods. All types of documents which indicate that the food is safe and 
fit for human consumption are accepted. These could include a Health Certificate, a Certificate of 
Analysis (CoA), or other similar documents. Therefore, the food safety level of the exported 
products that come to Indonesia will be diverse depending on the level of the food safety system 
in the exporting countries. Ever since regular testing at the border was terminated, monitoring 
through irregular sampling and laboratory testing has been conducted to ensure the compliance of 
exporters. An adequate monitoring program becomes a very significant tool to ensure the exporting 
country comply with Indonesia's food safety requirement. If the risk assessment can be adequately 
conducted, the new provisions under Regime 3 can be considered as more efficient risk-based food 
safety inspection policy, in comparison to Regime 2. However, like other developing countries, 
with limited capacities to develop adequate risk assessment criteria, the newest food safety 
mechanism (R3-Mechanism C) might weaken public health protections in Indonesia. 
Summary 
 Ensuring food safety to protect public health and promote economic development remains 
a significant challenge in both developing and developed countries (FAO, 2016). Since 2009, 
Indonesia has been struggling to develop an adequate import food safety policies while balancing 
the international trade, politic, and financial issues. The newest regulation was developed to 
strengthen the consumer protection from hazardous food and to provide a more effective approach 
to food safety control particularly in entry/exit points based on a risk-based inspection method. 
However, some main challenges still need to be addressed to ensure the food safety objectives are 
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met. In general, the implications for food safety of imported fresh agri-products in the context of 
the human rights to food and food sovereignty in Indonesia are:  
• The need to modify food safety policies to meet trade rules or the demand from related 
stakeholders including exporting countries which might have a negative impact on the 
human right to adequate food, and also the right to life and health.  
• Food safety policy in Indonesia seems susceptible to pressure from the private sector (e.g., 
in the case of excluding cacao during Regime 3). Strong opposition from stakeholders 
including exporting countries and private sectors is possibly jeopardizing government 
authority and public health. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FINDINGS 
This chapter provides research findings as derived from the research questions. The 
chapter is divided into two parts: the findings from secondary data analysis to demonstrate the 
disparity of food safety standards between selected WTO Members, and from interviews as 
primary data to explore the human rights-based approach to food safety, especially for imported 
fresh agri-products in Indonesia. The chapter investigates inequality in food safety standards 
between more and less developed countries and identifies strategies less developed countries 
may be taking to improve their food safety inspection and monitoring. 
II.1. Secondary Data Analysis: Disparity of Food Safety Standards between Selected WTO 
Members 
II.1.1. National Food Safety Standards (Pesticide Residues) of Selected WTO members 
The disparity of food safety standards among selected WTO members was explored by 
comparing the national food safety standards of selected countries, particularly the standards of 
maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides residues of six (6) commodities and 19 countries 
which later summarized using a table and graphs. The MRL standards of pesticide residues in 
certain commodities from several countries were chosen to exhibit the inequality of food safety 
standards amid countries. MRLs were used in this study because can be quantified in number 
(for example, the number of MRLs by commodity and by country) and the global MRL data are 
also freely available. In addition, pesticide residues are one of the main concern for food safety 
in Indonesia. More MRLs for the specific commodities in one country versus another country 
suggests a higher scope of monitoring to ensure the safety of food supply (food safety control), 
particularly for pesticide residues. Thus, graphic presentation of those differences might 
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demonstrate unequal food safety standards between countries, specifically because countries 
with fewer MRLs have fewer tools to monitor and manage the number of pesticide residues 
contained in their food.  
Six commodities were selected as samples to test the trend or consistency of the 
differences (of MRL standard) between countries across commodities. Since Indonesia was used 
as a case study, the commodities were chosen based on the import data of fresh agri-products to 
Indonesia in 2017 to represent key import food commodities. The dataset was collected from the 
Online Database of Import-Export Agricultural Commodities, the Ministry of Agriculture, The 
Republic of Indonesia (MoA, 2018). Data processing was conducted using Microsoft Excel. Six 
main imported commodities with the most significant import volume were selected as 
representative of each food categories (grains, fruits, vegetables, beans, and nuts). The selected 
commodities are wheat grain, apples, garlic, soybean, peanuts, and rice. Rice was added due to 
its importance as a staple food in Indonesia. 
Using the same data set, in addition to Indonesia, 18 countries (including the European 
Union/EU) with the most significant import volume of fresh agri-products to Indonesia were 
selected. In this analysis, the EU is regarded as one “country” because every EU member must 
follow the same food safety standards developed by the European Commission/EC (EC, n.d.). 
These selected countries are divided into three categories: developed countries, developing 
countries, and least-developed countries (LDCs). According to the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development/UNCTAD (2018), “[t]here is no established convention for the 
designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas in the United Nations system.” 
The WTO also has no definition of “developed” and “developing” countries as quoted below:  
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There are no WTO definitions of “developed” and “developing” countries. Members 
announce for themselves whether they are “developed” or “developing” countries. 
However, other members can challenge the decision of a member to make use of [trade] 
provisions [such as getting technical assistance from developed countries or a longer 
transition period before they are required to fully implement an agreement] available to 
developing countries (WTO, 2018). 
UNCTAD (2018) classifies countries based on their economic development into three 
categories: developing economies, transition economies, and developed economies. Additionally, 
the WTO (2018) recognizes a list of “Least-developed countries/LDCs” which are designated by 
the UNCTAD. Currently, 36 of 47 LDCs on the UN list are WTO members, and eight more are 
negotiating to join the WTO as LDCs: Bhutan, Comoros, Ethiopia, Sao Tomé & 
Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Timor-Leste (WTO, 2018). Furthermore, countries’ 
classifications based on the level of income from the World Bank were also included in the table. 
The World Bank (2018) defines each category as follows: 
For the current 2019 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI 
[Gross National Income] per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of 
$995 or less in 2017; lower-middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita 
between $996 and $3,895; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita 
between $3,896 and $12,055; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of 
$12,056 or more (The World Bank, 2018) 
The existing national food safety standards for pesticide residues of 19 countries (including 
Indonesia and the EU) were summarized from the information provided on a website developed 
by Bryant Christie Inc. (BCI): GlobalMRL.com and can be seen in Table 5 below.   
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Table 5. National Food Safety Standards for Pesticide Residues (Source: BCI, 2018) 
No Country 
Development 
status 
Income 
level 
National Food Safety 
Standard 
Defer to the Codex MRLs? 
Using Uniform Limit/ 
Default MRL 
1 Australia Developed High Income 
FSANZ Joint Food Standard 
Code -Schedule 20- MRL 
No, but Australia will consider 
work the Codex has undertaken 
when conducting its reviews. (NZ 
MRLs are recognized)  
No, but until 2017, had been 
using zero tolerance (“No 
detectable residue) 
2 Canada Developed High Income PMRA MRL Database 2016 No  0.1 ppm (General MRL) 
3 EU Developed High Income 
Regulation 369/2005 
Annexes amended to 
Regulation 2016/11016 
No (EU member states adopted the 
EU MRL) 
0.01 ppm 
4 Japan Developed High Income MHLW (FCRT Database) No 0.01 ppm 
5 
New 
Zealand 
(NZ) 
Developed High Income 
Food Regulation 2015, Food 
Notice MRLs 2016 
Yes, for imported food, even if 
there is an established NZ MRL, a 
higher value (less restrictive) The 
Codex MRLs will be accepted. 
(Australia MRLs are recognized) 
0.1     ppm (Higher value (less 
restrictive) the Codex MRLs 
are also accepted if the NZ 
MRLs is set at the default 
MRL of 0.1 ppm.) 
6 US Developed High Income EPA 40, CFR 180 No No, but using zero tolerance 
7 South Korea Developing High Income KFDO Food Code 2015 
Yes, if no national MRL, but only 
for a specific commodity, not on a 
crop group 
0.01 ppm on Jan 1, 2017, for 
Nuts, Seeds and Tropical and 
Subtropical 0.01 ppm for 
Fruits and others in Dec 2018 
8 China Developing 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
ICAMA Regulation to GB 
2763 2016 
No (but will consider The Codex 
MRLs in cases where there is a 
residue dispute on specific 
shipments.) 
No 
9 Malaysia Developing 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
Amendment of Regulation 41 
and Sixteenth Schedule, Food 
Regulations 1985: Pesticides 
Residue 
Yes, if no national MRLs 0.01 ppm 
10 Singapore Developing 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
AVA – Food Regulation – 
the Sale of Food Act (CAP 
283) 
Yes, if no national MRLs No 
11 South Africa Developing 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
Foodstuffs, Cosmetics, 
Disinfectant Act 1972, 
amended 19 Jan 2012 
Yes, if no national or the EU 
MRLs exist 
0.01   ppm 
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Table 5 (continued) 
No Country 
Development 
status 
Income 
level 
Food Safety Standard Defer to the Codex MRLs? Default MRL 
12 Thailand Developing 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
Ministry of Agriculture 
(AFCS) TAS 9002-2013, 
TAS 9003-2004 
Yes, (and also ASEAN MRLs) 0.01    ppm 
13 Indonesia Developing 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Regulation of Minister of 
Agriculture 04 of 2015 
No, but the national standard is 
fully adopting (Codex MRLs 
2014) 
No 
14 India Developing 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
The Food Safety and 
Standard Regulation 2011 
No (after August 28, 2014) *) 
In the process of proposing a 
positive limit of 0.01 ppm 
15 Vietnam Developing 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
MoH Circular 50/2016/TT-
BYT of 30 December 2016. 
No (Only national MRLs currently 
applied to food safety inspections, 
including imported products) 
No 
16 Bangladesh Least Developed 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
‘Bangladesh Food Safety 
(Contaminants, Toxins, and 
Harmful Residues) 
Regulations, 2017’ 
N/A **) 
No 
17 Cambodia Least Developed 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
No National MRLs (in the 
process of officially adopting 
The Codex standards, but as 
of late 2012 this was not yet 
official 
Yes, generally defer to the Codex 
or ASEAN MRLs 
No 
18 Mozambique Least Developed 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
No National MRL N/A **) 
No 
19 Myanmar Least Developed 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
No National MRL defers fully to the Codex 
No 
 
      
 *) It was formerly understood that India accepted the Codex MRLs if no national MRL was established; however, a High Court Order from August 28, 2014, indicates that the Codex MRLs may 
no longer be accepted (BCI, 2018). 
 
 **) No data for national MRL, GlobalMRL.com displays the Codex MRLs (July 2018) 
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II.1.2. Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) and Default MRL 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) described Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) 
for Pesticide Residues as “the highest level of a pesticide residue that is legally tolerated in or on 
food or feed when pesticides are applied correctly in accordance with Good Agricultural 
Practice” (FAO/WHO, 2018). The European Commission (2005) defined MRL as “the upper 
legal levels of a concentration for pesticide residues (expressed in mg/kg) in or on food or feed 
based on good agricultural practices (GAP) and to ensure the lowest possible consumer 
exposure.” On the other hand, the U.S. used the term “tolerances” in place of MRL, which define 
as the maximum amount of a pesticide allowed to remain in or on food commodities (EPA, 
2018). Furthermore, the European Commission (2014) in EC SANCO/3346/2001 rev 7, 
Guidance Document on Notification Criteria for Pesticide Residue Findings to the Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed explained:  
MRLs are often mistaken for toxicological safety limits. MRLs are safe limits that define 
the maximum expected levels of a pesticide on a food commodity after safe and 
authorized use of that pesticide. They serve both to prevent illegal and/or excessive use of 
a pesticide (e.g., to prevent damage to the environment or to the health of workers and 
bystanders) and to protect the health of consumers of the harvested product (EC, 2014). 
MRLs can be understood as the relative capacity of a country to test for pesticide residue. 
Countries with more MRLs theoretically can safeguard against more pesticide residues (although 
a country does not have to test all of the MRLs they have established) and presumably can 
therefore better protect their country’s public health. 
As can be seen in Table 5 above, both developed and developing countries have their 
own national MRLs, while the LDCs do not, with the exception of Bangladesh which has 
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established recently a national food safety regulation in 2017. Additionally, most developed 
countries have robust national MRLs and do not recognize the Codex MRLs whose standards 
they consider insufficient (BCI, 2018). NZ has a different approach and will consider the Codex 
MRLs only when it has a higher value (less restrictive) than NZ MRLs (BCI, 2018). Developed 
countries also utilize a uniform limit for other pesticide contaminants that have not developed in 
their national standard. However, the terminology used differs between countries. On May 29, 
2006, Japan introduced the term “positive list system” following the EU that had been 
established the system since 2005 (MHLW, 2006).  Japan Ministry of Health, Labour, and 
Welfare/MHLW (2006) stated that “the objective of establishing a positive list system for 
agricultural chemicals [including pesticide residues] is to prohibit the distribution of foods that 
contain agricultural chemicals above a certain level if maximum residue limits (MRLs) have not 
been established.” Japan sets a uniform limit of 0.01 ppm as the maximum level of chemicals 
that can remain in foods to protect public health and provided an argument as follows: 
The uniform limit has been set at 0.01 ppm so that the estimated intake of agricultural 
chemicals to which the limit would be applied does not exceed 1.5 µg/day when calculated 
based on the food consumption of Japanese population. In January 2005, the European 
Union, which would introduce the positive list system, established the uniform level at 0.01 
ppm. Considering such circumstances, the MHLW has decided that the limit is reasonable 
(MHLW, 2006). 
As shown in Table 5, other developed countries also have their own uniform limit with 
different levels and different terms. Canada and New Zealand (NZ) referred to the positive list as 
“default MRL” and set the same 0.1 ppm as their standard. New Zealand, regarding their Food 
Regulations (2015), defined the default MRL as:  
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[T]he residue level of the agricultural compound present in the food does not exceed 
0.1mg/kg, and there is no notice (i) specifying a maximum residue level of the agricultural 
compound that may be present in the food; or (ii) providing that no maximum residue level 
for the agricultural compound applies to the food (NZ Food Regulation, 2015). 
Australia previously had a stricter limit by using the term “not traceable,” which means the limit 
depends on the detection limit of the analysis instrument used to detect the residue. However, in 
their new Food Standard Code – Standard 1.4.2. -  Agvet Chemicals (2016), the term has been 
removed, and Australia has developed a new approach to avoid application of ‘zero tolerance’ to 
the presence of low-level pesticide residues in food commodities (FSANZ, 2016). Meanwhile, 
the U.S. addressed the positive list as “zero tolerance” in their regulation, EPA Title 40– 
Protection of Environment – Part 180 Tolerances and Exemptions for Pesticide Chemical 
Residues in Food: 
A zero tolerance means that no amount of the pesticide chemical may remain on the raw 
agricultural commodity when it is offered for shipment and may be established if: (i) the 
pesticide chemical is toxic, but is normally used at times when, or in such manner that, 
fruit, vegetables, or other raw agricultural commodities will not bear or contain it, or (ii) 
all residue of the pesticide chemical is normally removed through good agricultural 
practice such as washing or brushing or through weathering or other changes in the 
chemical itself, prior to introduction of the raw agricultural commodity into interstate 
commerce (EPA Tittle 40, §180.6). 
Recently, developing countries began to include a positive list approach to their national food 
safety standards. Malaysia has been adopting positive list as part of their food safety standard 
since 2015. In their Food Regulations 2015, Malaysia sets 0.01 ppm as a default MRLs that 
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applied if there are no established national standard or the Codex standards for specified 
pesticide on foods. South Africa is also using default MRL 0.01 ppm when there is no Codex, the 
EU, or nationally established MRLs (BCI, 2018). South Korea, a developing country with high 
income, on January 1, 2017, applied default MRL 0.01 ppm for specific products (nuts, seeds, 
and tropical and subtropical fruits). The same default MRL will be applied to other fruits and 
other produce in December 2018 (BCI, 2018). On January 27, 2017, the Thai Food and Drug 
Administration notified the WTO (G/SPS/N/THA/183/Rev.1) on the Ministry of Public Health 
(MOPH) Notification regarding Food Containing Pesticide Residues, that Thailand will be 
adding default MRL to their food safety standards (USDA FAS, 2017).  
The process of establishing MRLs (Maximum Residue Limits) can be costly and time-
consuming, which might limit the capacity of a lower income country (or a country with limited 
resources) to establish their national MRLs. The European Commission (2016) explained the 
procedure for setting MRLs under Regulation (EC) Number 396/2005 in a Guidance Document 
for MRL Setting Procedure. The procedure consists of nineteen (19) rigorous steps where the 
overall process takes at least 24 months to establish a single MRL (EC, 2016). The Ministry of 
Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) of Korea (2014) mentioned that the processing period for 
establishing a new MRL in Korea is 365 working days and the processing cost is $25,000 for 
toxicology data and approximately $4,500 for residue data per one MRL. Likewise, the U.S. 
government stipulated the fees for setting new MRLs (tolerance) or an MRLs higher than already 
established at $80,950, plus $2,025 for each raw agricultural commodity more than nine on 
which the establishment of tolerance is requested (EPA Title 40, §180). Evidently, establishing 
new MRLs requires a financial cost that can create an additional burden for national food safety 
authority. 
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II.1.3. Comparison of MRLs between Countries 
The MRLs data set from each country (19 countries) and for each commodity (6 
commodities) was collected from a US-based MRL database. Bryant Christie Inc. (BCI) 
developed this data set, known as the Global MRL Database, to analyze disparities in food safety 
standards between WTO members. The Global MRL Database collects data using several 
sources as follows:  
• U.S. Federal Register;  
• USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) GAIN Reports;  
• Official Journal of the European Union;  
• World Trade Organization (WTO) notifications issued by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committees;  
• FAO/WHO Food Standards Codex Alimentarius;  
• Over 60 additional national government regulatory agencies and websites;  
• In-country experts and regulators who are also frequently consulted on policy matters (BCI, 
2018).  
Before being managed by BCI, the Global MRL Database was previously maintained by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) (FAO, n.d.). Free access to the Database for US-based users 
(sponsored by USDA and EPA) is available with online registration. The database is designed 
specifically for users in the US are only reported when the same US MRL regulation is applied 
in each, separate commodity (BCI, 2018), i.e., the active ingredient of pesticide residues and 
commodity menus available in the Global MRL Database are limited to those listed in the U.S. 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 40 CFR 180 Subpart C for pesticide-specific tolerances 
(BCI, 2018). The limitation of using the Global MRL Database is that the MRLs data excluding 
some MRLs that are regulated by a country but are not established by the US. 
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The MRLs data were processed using Microsoft Excel. The six graphs presented as part 
of Figure 6 below were created to show the differences of MRL standards between selected 
countries.  
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Figure 6. Comparison of the MRLs of Pesticide Residues (Source: Global MRL, 2018) 
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Figure 6 (Continued) 
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Figure 6 (Continued) 
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In each graph above, the bars showed the number of MRL standards set by each country. 
There are 4 sets of color for each bar. The blue color represents the number of national MRLs, 
established as described earlier in the chapter. The grey stands for the number of the Codex 
MRLs adopted by the country. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Codex MRLs are international 
standards set by Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and freely available to all countries; 
encouraged by the WTO to be adopted; generally fully or partially followed by countries with no 
or limited national MRLs, or serving as an addition to national MRLs. Orange bars represent the 
number of the EU MRLs adopted by other country. The EU produced a number of MRLs; these 
are both used by EU countries like national MRL standards and by non-EU countries alike i.e. 
South Africa. The yellow bar represents the number of default MRLs applied in each 
commodity. 
Higher bars indicate that countries with greater numbers of MRL standards for respective 
individual commodities can be assumed to have more stringent, complex, and thorough food 
safety standards than do countries with less coverage of MRLs (Curzi, Luarasi, Raimondi & 
Olper, 2018). For example, Figure 6 showed that generally, the developed countries reviewed 
such as the EU, Japan, the US, and Australia have more robust national food safety 
standards/national MRLs (blue bars) for all six commodities portrayed than do other fifteen 
countries reviewed. Further, those more developed countries do not refer to or adopt the 
international Codex standards (note absence of grey bar), with the exception of New Zealand 
(NZ). Codex MRLs are used to supplement its national list (BCI, 2018). For imported food, even 
if there is an established NZ MRL or the default MRL of 0.1 ppm, NZ will accept the Codex 
MRLs when it has a higher value (less restrictive) (BCI, 2018). Australia and the U.S. do not use 
the term “default MRL,” but they are establishing “zero-tolerance” policy (see Table 5). 
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However, BCI (2018) interpreted that those two countries do not apply the default MRLs system. 
If we exclude the zero-tolerance policy, Australia and the U.S. have less MRLs standard 
compare to other developed countries (smaller total composite bar).  
Based on the data in Table 5 and Figure 6, it is noticeable that in general, the domestic 
protection from unsafe imported food, most specifically protection from pesticide residues, that 
can be provided by national governments in developed versus developing countries can be 
unequal. Developed countries have the capability and capacity to develop their own national 
MRLs to provide a higher level of protection from the hazard of pesticide residues. Higher 
income developing countries (e.g., South Korea) have stricter standards with higher number of 
national MRLs (blue bar), in addition to default MRLs, as compared to developing countries 
with higher-middle or lower-middle incomes; see Figure 6 e.g. China, South Africa, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Meanwhile, most LDCs have no national food safety 
standards established and can only rely entirely on the Codex standards (grey bar). BCI (2018) 
clarified that Cambodia, Mozambique, and Myanmar do not appear to maintain a national 
pesticide regulation program and the U.S. exporters are recommended to refer to the Codex 
MRLs when exporting to those countries. 
A noticeable pattern can be seen from some developing countries that have been applying 
a multi-step deferral policy such as Malaysia, Thailand, and South Africa. Deferral paths are “the 
decision trees used by some countries to determine acceptable MRLs when a national MRL is 
not established” (BCI, 2018, FAQ). Countries with basic deferral paths, such as most LDCs, do 
not have a national MRL regulation. Although in the database, as a precaution, BCI consider all 
countries that do not have national MRL to defer wholly to international MRL regulation, 
specifically, to the Codex MRL standard (BCI, 2018). For other developing countries, in cases 
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where a national MRL is not established, might apply a deferral policy. Deferral paths can be 
complex and may involve multiple standards from other markets (e.g., the Codex, the EU, etc.) 
and default MRLs (BCI, 2018). For example, a country might defer to the MRL standard from 
the EU MRL regulation, in addition to the Codex and default MRL.  
Malaysia is one of the first developing countries that has been adopting the positive list as 
part of their food safety standard. They are using a unique deferral path, as follows: (1) National 
MRLs; (2) the Codex MRLs; (3) ASEAN MRLs; and (4) Default MRL of 0.01 ppm (BCI, 2018). 
Using a layered standard, even though their national standard seems to be very limited and far 
less than other developing countries, their policy to adopt the positive list system might arguably 
be able to leverage the public health protection in Malaysia. Thailand has been following the 
same path with a more complex deferral process, as follows: (1) National MRLs (Schedule 2) 
and extraneous MRLs (Schedule 4); (2) the Codex MRLs; (3) Pesticide-specific default MRLs 
set in the Schedule 3; (4) Default MRLS of 0.01 ppm. 
As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 6, Malaysia and Thailand have almost the same 
number of MRLs (total bars) as does South Korea. South Africa has also been developing a 
deferral policy by adopting three layers of standards: the EU MRLs, the Codex MRLs, and 
default MRL (BCI, 2018). However, the South Africa deferral policy differs from those of 
Malaysia and Thailand because South Africa will first refer to higher MRLs from the Codex and 
the EU before applying their national MRLs. Africa’s multi-step deferral policy can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) The higher (less restrictive) value of international the Codex and the European Union MRLs 
is accepted.  
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2) If there is neither a Codex MRL nor an EU MRL, then the South African national MRL 
applies, if established.  
3) If there is no Codex, the EU, or South African established MRL, then the default MRL of 
0.01 ppm applies (BCI, 2018) 
South Africa’s multi-step deferral policy probably gives it higher protection because it helps 
increase the number of MRLs. As shown in Figure 6, South Africa barely has national MRLs 
(blue bars) for those six commodities. However, by adopting the rigorous EU standard (orange 
bar) and default MRL (yellow bar), in addition to the Codex MRLs (grey bar), South Africa’s 
policy provides very high coverage of MRLs (total bar), which is sometimes even higher than 
developed countries. 
A comparison across commodities shows consistent country MRL standard differences. 
The EU has the highest number of MRL standards for soybeans (494 MRLs) compared to other 
five products, which is double the MRL standard in other developed countries such as Canada, 
Japan, and NZ. South Africa is in the second place with 427 MRLs. Soybeans are known as a 
crop grown with heavy use of pesticides, (Stanley, 2017), and most developed countries grow 
soybeans. The United States Department of Agriculture/USDA (2014) collected and compiled 
the data of pesticide used in the US on 21 crops for in 2008 (Figure 7). Those twenty-one crops 
account for approximately 72 percent of total conventional pesticide use in U.S. agriculture 
(USDA, 2018). The data showed that soybean is in the second top pesticide-using crop in the US 
(21.7%); wheat shared 4.5% of pesticide use in the US; peanuts 2%, rice 1.5%; apples 1.4%; and 
no data for pesticide use in garlic (USDA, 2018). In order to protect public health, it is therefore 
unsurprising that the MRL standard for soybean in average is high relative to other commodities. 
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Figure 7. Pesticide use by 21 selected crops in the U.S. in 2008 (USDA, 2018) 
 
Although the USDA data showed that pesticide use in wheat is three times more than 
pesticide use in apple, the average number MRLs for apple is slightly higher than for wheat. 
Unlike soybeans, the number of the EU MRLs for apple and wheat are similar to other developed 
countries while South Africa has the biggest number of MRLs. Garlic has the lowest average 
number of MRLs standard and the country with the highest MRLs number is South Africa (250 
MRLS), followed by EU at 182 MRLs. Referring to the USDA’s data, it is possible that the 
lower number of MRLs garlic is correlated to its lower use of the pesticide. For rice, most 
countries with high rice consumption per capita such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, and 
Myanmar have smaller number of MRLs than developed countries or countries with deferral 
policy. In 2013, Bangladesh ranked the highest in rice consumption per capita with 172 kg 
(Helgi Library, 2018). Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar were ranked, respectively, fourth, fifth, 
and sixth in rice consumption per capita (Helgi Library, 2018). However, as can be seen from the 
graph, the number of established national MRLs in those four countries is limited compared to 
other countries reviewed, even though most of them referring to the Codex standards.  
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Moreover, although China ranked first in peanut-producing and is also the top peanut-
consuming country in the world, their national standards for peanut are minimal compared to 
other commodities such as wheat, soybean, rice, and apple. With the exception of soybeans, 
South Africa with its unique multi-step deferral policy has the most significant number of MRLs 
in all five commodities, exceeding the developed countries MRLs. Developing countries that do 
not defer entirely to the Codex MRLs or another standard such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam have 
the lowest number of MRLs in general for all commodities, including rice: a staple food for 
those countries. The LDCs, however, will have more MRL standard when (if) they are fully 
adopting the Codex standards. 
II.1.4. Implications of MRL Comparisons 
The MRL comparison presented in this section was created to display quantitatively the 
disparity of food safety standards between WTO’s members, particularly between developed, 
developing, and least-develop countries. The findings showed that developed countries generally 
establish their own national standards and further, they add an additional layer of protection, i.e., 
default MRL/positive list. Some developing countries have been developing a multi-step deferral 
policy, i.e., a hybrid process of adopting other international standards such as the Codex or the 
EU MRLs, along with their national standard, as well as adopting default MRL. The MRLs 
comparison provided data to show that a multi-step deferral policy may be a strategy for lower-
income countries to improve their food safety control on pesticide residues. Developing 
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and South Africa are able to leverage their MRL standard, 
i.e., they have increased the number of MRLs they can test, by utilizing a multi-step deferral 
policy, i.e. adopting the Codex or the EU standards and default MRL. Further research is 
necessary to understand how and why those countries are able to implement other countries’ 
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standards without providing their own scientific justification given that this process of adoption 
seemingly contradicts WTO rules. 
II.2. Primary Data: Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to analyze the interpretations from different 
stakeholders regarding food sovereignty, the human right to adequate (safe) food in Indonesia, 
food trade, and Indonesia’s food safety regulation. Interviewees in this research were divided 
into several categories based on their occupations: government food safety officials (5 
interviewees), civil society organizations/CSO (5 interviewees), university-based food safety 
experts (2 interviewees), and importers (2 interviewees) (See Appendix 5). Each table below 
summarizes what the interviewees had to say about several key issues, as follows: right to 
adequate food, food self-sufficiency/food independence6, food sovereignty, food security, food 
safety, free trade, the WTO, the SPS Agreement, the Codex, and Indonesia’s food safety 
regulation, in the context of food safety and trade. Note that the first four categories following 
the right to food reflect key aspects of national food policy as iterated in the 2012 Indonesian 
Food Law. The latter five reflect the thesis question direction related to national food safety 
policy, especially on imported fresh agricultural products. 
II.2.1. Right to Adequate Food 
As can be seen from Table 5, interviewees from government food safety officials 
(Indonesia Agriculture Quarantine Agency/IAQA) are not familiar with the right to food, 
                                                          
6 The word “Kemandirian Pangan” in the Indonesia 2012 Food Law has been translated into either food self-
sufficiency or food independence. According to Dr. Iqbal Rafani from Indonesian Center for Agricultural Socio 
Economic and Policy Studies (ICASEPS), Ministry of Agriculture, Indonesia, “Food independence is semantically 
related to food self-sufficiency and food resilience. The word “independence” entails the ability of the state and 
nation to produce its own food diversity by utilizing the potential of natural resources in the country, and the word 
“self-sufficiency” refers to a situation in which a state may meet all or most of the food needs of the population from 
domestic production” (See Chapter 1. Literature Review and Chapter 3. Discussion). 
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particularly the field inspectors. When asked about what he knows about the right to food, a 
laboratory analyst at the Agricultural Quarantine Major Service (AQMS) of Tanjung Priok said, 
“Safe, wholesome ---safe, and halal, if I am not wrong though. I don’t really understand” (PO2, 
2018). Interviewees who are or were working in the IAQA’s Central Office in Jakarta or were 
involved in food safety related policy-making seem to recognize the term of the right to food.  
Table 6. Summary of Interview Findings A: Right to (Adequate) Food 
Indonesia’s 
Food Law 
Government food 
safety officials 
(n=5) 
CSOs 
(n=5) 
University-based 
food safety experts 
(n=2) 
Importers 
(n=2) 
“Food is the 
essential human 
need, and its 
fulfillment is part 
of human rights 
that are 
guaranteed in the 
1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of 
Indonesia as a 
basic component 
in creating quality 
human 
resources” (The 
2012 Food Law, 
p.1). 
• Interviewees, 
particularly the 
field inspectors 
are not familiar 
with the right to 
food. 
• Other 
interviewees 
viewed the RtF 
as the basic 
need that must 
be fulfilled by the 
government, but 
the dignity or the 
access aspect of 
right to food 
were not 
mentioned. 
• Generally, CSOs have an adequate 
understanding of the right to food, 
especially regarding accessibility. 
• The first principle of the right to food is 
to respect people’s right to determine 
what to eat and to produce based on 
their own culture and methods. 
• The right to food must be fulfilled, 
respected, and protected by the 
government and respected by the 
private sectors. 
• The recognition of the right to food in 
Indonesia is relatively low, even more 
for the right to adequate food. 
• The United Nation needs to promote a 
more progressive right to food 
approach. 
• The international 
definition of right to 
food is analogous 
with food security. 
• The right to food 
concept was 
translated to food 
sovereignty by the 
CSOs.  
• In Indonesia, the 
adaption of the 
right to food leans 
toward food 
sovereignty which 
applied through 
the 2012 Food 
Law.  
 
 
By providing 
quality food 
for people in 
Indonesia, 
the food 
industry is 
probably 
assisting the 
realization of 
the right to 
adequate 
food. 
 
no one has, however, an in-depth knowledge of the right to food as can be gleaned from a 
comment from a senior officer who works at the Central Office of IAQA: “Human right to safe 
food is one of the basic needs that has to be fulfilled by the government for their people, so 
Indonesia's people can achieve a decent quality life” (PO5, 2018). Moreover, he and a senior 
official who used to work at the central office—but now serves as Head of Plant Quarantine in 
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the AQMS of Tanjung Priok—mentioned the obligation of Indonesia’s government to fulfill the 
right to food but never connect it with the accessibility or dignity dimension.  
 Meanwhile, almost all respondents from CSOs convey a better understanding on the right 
to adequate food as shown by the answer from Said Abdullah, National Coordinator for People’s 
Coalition on Food Sovereignty (Koalisi Rakyat untuk Kedaulatan Pangan/KRKP): “I think the 
international convention has regulated the right to food right, that everyone does have the right 
to---not only get or have access but also to consume food and not only food but healthy and 
adequate food so that he might be able to live according to---what---according to what--- 
periodization [life expectancy] that he must [could] achieve. For example, children, not only how 
he eats, not only can he get a plate of rice, fish and so on, but also eat, what is being eaten also 
must have the nutritional value of course, and the second is, free from germs, for example” 
(Abdullah, S., 2018). Tejo Wahyu Jatmiko, National Coordinator from Indonesia Berseru—an 
institution that works on poverty and sustainable natural resource management and pro-
community groups, adults and children, men and women—shared similar thoughts about right to 
adequate food: “Right to food…right to food it's not just about the sufficiency or the quantity, 
but also from the nutrition and safety side, which means [that food] do not contain hazardous 
contaminants”. He then continued with the obligation of the state in the realization of the right to 
food: “… and then we have adopted it [right to food] into the new law, that food is a human 
right. I think the right to healthy and safe food must be fulfilled by the State because the State 
must fulfill human rights--- respect, protect, fulfill” (Jatmiko, TW., 2018).  
From the CSO respondents, another interviewee, Wiwid Widiyanto, project manager 
from Oxfam Indonesia, argued that the private sector also needs to respect the right to food: 
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“… An adequate food, healthy food, it is also included in---as part of one of the human rights 
that must be fulfilled by the government and respected by the company" (Widiyanto, W., 2018). 
Some CSOs also pointed out that the realization of the right to food in Indonesia is relatively 
low, much less the right to adequate food. As illustrated by Lutfiyah Hanim, a senior researcher 
from Indonesia Global Justice (IGJ) “… Since food is a human right, so every citizen has the 
right to food---and---in this case, the Government and also all parties strive to ensure the right to 
food is achieved. Right now---it's still about food supply. … So, the truth is, the right to food for 
citizens, even farmers are not guaranteed. …” (Hanim, L., 2018). IGJ is a CSO that works on 
global trade liberalization issues, particularly on monitoring and responding to trade-related 
priority issues including the WTO (IGJ, n.d). 
University-based food safety experts present a distinct perspective regarding the right to 
food. Dasep Wahidin, a food inspector from National Agency of Food and Drug Control 
(NAFDC) and a doctor in food law, explained how by definition, according to international law, 
right to food can be translated to food security because the description of the right to food in 
CESCR is corresponding to food security. He explained: “… The concept---the concept, per se, 
is appropriate if we read in CESCR, they---they define what right to food means, which is very 
rigid, very, what is it---very similar with the definition of food security. … So, what--- what is 
meant by the right to food is the fulfillment of food security" (Wahidin, D., 2018). He then added 
that, in Indonesia, the right to food is transcribed as food sovereignty. “… At the international 
level, the right to food leans towards food security, by definition, this is from the definition eh. 
But, in Indonesia, right to food essentially is more about food sovereignty, and it had been 
established since the Food Law Number 18 0f 2012 was enforced” (Wahidin, D., 2018).  
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An importer of industrial raw materials (Unilever) assumed that they might contribute to 
the realization of the right to adequate food by providing what they perceived as quality food: 
“… No, I mean --- (I) don't have a lot of knowledge (about it). But actually, maybe, in practice, 
what we do is to fulfill that. Because at Unilever, we're very serious in developing our food and 
beverage products, you know. So, we're thinking about the sugar content, salt content, things like 
that. Because we believe, consumers should have the best. So, I think more or less; the concept is 
like that eh.. that everyone in Indonesia has the right to get quality food” (I2, 2018). 
II.2.2. Food Sovereignty, Food Self-sufficiency, and Food Security. 
Interview results from government officials show that interviewees who are working or 
were working in the head office of IAQA in Jakarta recognized the concept of food sovereignty 
from the Food Law No 18 of 2012, even though, based on their answers, they seem to have an 
un-examined acceptance of food sovereignty as the objective of the 2012 Food Law: 
I had read the Food Law Number 18 Year 2015---2012---regarding food sovereignty 
concept, and I think it's strong enough to welcome our food sovereignty in the era of 
2020 and so forth. That's my opinion since it's quite detailed, and quite---what should 
be done is that the Food Law 18 [of 2012] per se, must have the Government 
Regulation [abbreviated as GR, Regulations that stipulated by the Government to 
implement the Law at the operational level], the GR for operational, comprehensively, 
that has not been born yet. So, the Food Law 18 [of 2012] is still using the GR Number 
28 [of 2004 regarding Food Safety, Quality and, Nutrition]. This isn't right. So, [the 
new GR] must be---immediately---stipulated” (PO1, 2018). 
Another senior official stated: 
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Yes, the food sovereignty concept is surely---the Government must provide food that is safe, 
sufficient, nutritious, for the livelihood of Indonesia's people. The implementation of the 
policies has still---not, has not achieved the desired results. But, gradually the Government 
has tried to realize the systems to achieve food sovereignty itself" (PO5, 2018). 
Table 7 below summarizes the interviewee’s view on food sovereignty, food self-sufficiency, 
and food security.
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Table 7. Summary of Interview Findings B: Food Sovereignty, Food Self-sufficiency, and Food Security 
Topics Legal Definition 
(Indonesia’s Food Law) 
Government  
food safety officials 
(n=5) 
CSOs 
(n=5) 
University-based  
food safety experts 
(n=2) 
Importers 
(n=2) 
Food 
Sovereignty 
“The right of the state 
and nation that 
independently establish 
food policy that 
guarantees the right on 
food for the people and 
grants the right for the 
society to establish food 
system that is 
appropriate with the local 
potential resources” (The 
2012 Food Law, Article 1, 
para 2). 
 
• Either:  
1) An un-examined 
acceptance of food 
sovereignty as the 
objective of the 2012 
Food Law; or 
2) Not familiar with the 
adoption of food 
sovereignty in the 2012 
Food Law. 
• The food sovereignty 
concept in the 2012 Food 
Law is adequate. 
• Different opinion regarding 
the implementation, one 
said it is acceptable, the 
other thinks the goal has 
not been achieved yet.  
• Due to a lack of understanding, the 
government cannot differentiate 
between food sovereignty and food 
security. 
• Food sovereignty concept has been 
reduced into food security, i.e., 
neglecting the accessibility 
dimension. 
• Food sovereignty is about people’s 
sovereignty, the right to govern 
themselves. 
• Indonesia’s CSOs claim 
responsibility for the inclusion of 
food sovereignty language in the 
2012 Food Law. 
• Most of Indonesian CSO 
interviewees think that even though 
the food sovereignty has been 
adopted to the 2012 Food Law, the 
government still interprets it as food 
security or food self-sufficiency (i.e., 
the focus is on the food production, 
and not in the producers’ right), 
• The food sovereignty concept might 
sound utopist, in regards 
independency on food production, 
but it is do-able. 
• Food sovereignty will be 
achieved when “the mouth of 
Indonesia’s people” has been 
liberated (when people has the 
freedom to decide what they 
want to eat).  
• Internationally, there is no 
consensus on a formal, public, 
and institutional definition of food 
sovereignty (as in the case of 
FAO’s definition of food security) 
• The food sovereignty is an 
extension of food 
security/geographically or 
culturally defined food security. 
• Food sovereignty means the 
government can provide 
guaranteed access (to food), 
based on national self-
sufficiency. 
• Food sovereignty concept was 
not established in Indonesia’s 
law until the 2012 Food Law. 
• The political factor has a 
considerable influence on the 
achievement of food sovereignty, 
and the concept sometimes 
might sound utopist.  
• The food 
sovereignty or 
food security 
should be about 
guaranteed food 
availability, 
regardless it’s 
from import or 
local.  
• Not familiar with 
the adoption of 
food sovereignty 
in the 2012 Food 
Law. 
• Do not 
distinguish 
between food 
security and food 
sovereignty. 
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Topics Legal Definition 
(Indonesia’s Food Law) 
Government 
food safety officials 
(n=5) 
CSOs 
(n=5) 
University-based 
 food safety experts 
(n=2) 
Importers 
(n=2) 
Food Self-
sufficiency 
“The ability of the state 
and nation in producing 
various food domestically 
that can guarantee the 
fulfillment of sufficient 
Food demand that reach 
individual levels using 
potential natural, human, 
social, economic 
resources, and local 
wisdom with dignity.” 
(The 2012 Food Law, Art. 
1, para 3). 
N/A • Indonesia’s government reduces the 
interpretation of food sovereignty into 
food self-sufficiency for political 
expediency. 
• Food self-sufficiency should be 
determined locally not nationally.The 
staple food identified as establishing 
local self-sufficiency should be 
based on the local specificity and 
should take into account the rights of 
indigenous people to determine their 
culturally-determined staples (i.e., 
rice vs sago). 
• There are four entities in Indonesia’s 
food system: food sovereignty, food 
self-sufficiency, food security, and food 
safety. 
• Food self-sufficiency is a requirement 
to achieve national food sovereignty. 
• Until now, only the Government 
Regulation on Food security (as one of 
regulations to implement the 2012 
Food Law) has been enforced.  
• New Government Regulations 
regarding food sovereignty, food self-
sufficiency, and food safety to 
implement the 2012 Food Law have not 
been established. 
N/A 
Food 
Security 
“The fulfillment of Food 
for the state up to the 
individuals, that is 
reflected by Food 
availability that is 
sufficient, both in quantity 
and quality, safe, 
diverse,  
nutritious, prevalent and 
affordable as well as not 
conflicting with religion, 
belief and culture, to live 
healthy, active and 
productive in a 
sustainable manner.” 
(The 2012 Food Law, Art. 
1, p.4). 
 
Food security, 
particularly food 
availability has been 
prioritized by 
Indonesia’s 
government. 
• Generally, government policies on 
food security focus on availability and 
access to affordable food while 
overlooking the source of food 
(domestic or imported) 
• Food security talks about not the 
right of people to eat but the right of 
exporters to export. 
• Food security is strongly related to 
free trade. 
• Food security is too often defined by 
the market instead of actual quality 
food and quality food access. 
• Based on the financial budgeting, 
Indonesia’s government prioritized 
food security more than food safety 
and food sovereignty. 
• Indonesia’s government translates 
food security mostly into guaranteed 
food availability and increased food 
production. 
• The 1996 Food Law is limited to food 
security concept. 
• Based on the definition, food 
sovereignty is an extension of food 
security. 
The food 
sovereignty or food 
security should be 
about guaranteed 
food availability, 
regardless it’s from 
import or local.  
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Moreover, Indonesia CSOs and university-based food safety experts show a dichotomy in the 
interpretation of food sovereignty and food security. Based on the interview with CSOs, most 
interviewees argued that food sovereignty should be about the right of people to govern 
themselves, and the government has been reducing food sovereignty concept into food security, 
mainly into food production or self-sufficiency and ignoring small farmers as food producers. 
Flavio Valente, the Secretary General of FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN), 
asserted that  
…. Food sovereignty concept has been reduced---the Food Law reduces understanding, 
in our opinion, CSOs for example, if---in food sovereignty context, we cannot just talk 
about production, but what need to be discussed is about the subject, not the object, if 
the Food Law the one that becomes the object---the subject is food, so how does food 
increase, how is food available, even though in our conception of food sovereignty, the 
subject is farmers (Valente, F., 2018).  
 
This concern is also echoed by Indonesia’s CSOs. According to Jatmiko (2018), “… [F]ood 
sovereignty is still considered as---just as terminology but the implementation is merely on food 
security level. …. Food sovereignty must be based on the subject, i.e., farmers---all this time, 
they're still seen as an object” (Jatwiko, T.W., 2018). 
Other CSOs also argued that the inclusion of food sovereignty in the 2012 Food Law does 
not change how Indonesia’s government develops food policy and that the 2012 Food Law is the 
same as its predecessor, the 1996 Food Law, 
…. It's true that the [2012 Food] Law mandates food sovereignty as the final goal, and 
the recent government, Jokowi [in] 2014 said that food sovereignty is an essential part 
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of Nawacita [the 9 Development Agenda] but in practice, I think, there's nothing new, 
and nothing has changed, which means--- the approach, strategy, programmatic, 
everything is still very food security biased (Abdullah, S., 2018).  
 
Furthermore, according to Jatwiko from the Indonesia Berseru, to some extent, CSOs 
appreciate the government’s courage to adopt food sovereignty into the Law. However, he 
also shared the same sentiment regarding the misinterpretation of food sovereignty: 
… There are differences on definition and understanding between us who work in food 
sovereignty and the State. For us, (food sovereignty) in the Law, it has been jumbled. In 
our opinion, if it's food sovereignty regime, food security should have been done, 
because our understanding is, with food sovereignty we should have been able to 
decide what to produce and to consume with all the resources we have” (Jatwiko, 
2018).  
 
On the other hand, Wahidin (2018), the food safety expert, explained the four entities in 
Indonesia’s food system: food sovereignty, food self-sufficiency, food security, and food safety. 
He pointed out that to date, there is no international consensus on a definition of food 
sovereignty unlike food security. The concept of food security has a largely accepted definition 
by the FAO. He argued that food sovereignty is an extension of food security that is 
geographically or culturally defined: 
…. Food sovereignty, in my opinion, is more---in my language, it's “food security plus 
plus” ---what I mean by “plus plus” is, food security which is adjusted to the local 
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wisdom, with local content or local policies that apply in the country. … (Wahidin, D., 
2018).  
 
All respondents from CSOs and university-based food safety experts identified food 
access as a principal component of food sovereignty or food security, albeit with different 
perspectives. Some discussed it with the notion of food self-sufficiency, for example, the 
food safety expert, Wahidin (2018) stated that “… Because in essence, food sovereignty at 
the national level is, to guarantee consumer access to food, [and] whenever possible, the 
food is produced by domestically”. One of the importers argued that food security has no 
frontiers and the government should focus on producing only food that can be grown 
naturally according to the climate in Indonesia:  
I think, as the industry actually err… we couldn't say anymore that everything has to be 
local because foodstuffs are heavily related to climate, soils, and weather. So, food 
sovereignty or food security is more---in my opinion, more about how Indonesia 
strategically [can] always have a sustainable food supply for its people, regardless 
[whether the food is] from import or local [sources] (I2, 2018).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the food security concept was criticized by all CSOs. They argued that food 
security focuses on availability and access to affordable food while diminishing the importance 
of food sources. Some also indicated that food security had become a tool to support the WTO’s 
objective on free trade, as conveyed by Valente (2018):  
Food security basically is a fallacy, that is---it is the framework that goes hand in hand 
with---free trade. Because food security talks about the right of people to have you 
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know access to food, at all times, at the best cost, the cheapest cost, whatever---either 
it’s imported or exported or locally produced, it doesn’t make any difference 
theoretically under food security thing [concept]. .... Food security talks about not the 
right of people to eat but the right of exporters to export (Valente, F., 2018).  
 
Food availability has always been a political issue in Indonesia. Indonesia’s CSOs explained 
how their government reduces the interpretation of food sovereignty into food self-sufficiency 
due to political motives. For example, Jatmiko (2018) stated: 
.... The recent government was promoting food sovereignty as the success of government, 
translated into programs and policies, technical policies, which end up as how to increase 
rice production, how to increase corn production, how to increase soybean production, and 
meat, and sugar. So how.. how reductionist is this interpretation of food sovereignty 
(Jatmiko, T.W., 2018). 
Widyanto (2018) expressed the same concern and explained how the government policies 
of food self-sufficiency, particularly rice self-sufficiency, might impact the realization of 
the right to food for indigenous people: 
Food security is translated by the government as national food supply sufficiency. … 
The government suddenly came with a dominant concept---rice self-sufficiency. Which 
means it might become a threat for the Eastern people and their local food, notably 
Papua’s [people], which culturally not---from social-cultural don’t have the preference 
to eat rice, for example. Therefore, it might cause a critical issue for food 
diversification (Widyanto W., 2018).  
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In other words, when food self-sufficiency is defined at the national scale, it easily overlooks 
local concepts of self-sufficiency which may be culturally or environmentally determined as 
different from national definitions. Local identification of what constitutes self-sufficiency 
frames food sovereignty as a condition of negotiation and process across geographic scales.
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Table 8. Summary of Interview Findings C: Food Safety and Food Trade 
Topics Government food safety 
officials 
(n=5) 
CSOs 
(n=5) 
University-based food safety experts 
(n=2) 
Importers 
(n=2) 
Food Safety: 
“A condition and effort that 
is required to prevent food 
from the possibility of 
biological, chemical and 
other pollution that can 
interfere, harm and 
endanger the human 
health as well as not 
conflicting with religion, 
belief and culture of the 
society so that it is safe for 
consumption.” (Indonesia 
Food Law of 2012, p.5). 
 
• Food safety has not 
become a priority for 
Indonesia people. 
• Food safety standards 
must be based on risk 
assessment.  
 
• Due to a limited understanding of food security 
or food sovereignty concept, food system 
actors have been reducing food security 
concept into food safety. 
• Food safety has been used as a protectionist 
tool and the stringent food safety standard 
might hamper the right of small producers, local 
farmers.  
• The private sector has been lobbying 
government and influencing food safety policy-
making for example, by funding biased 
research to support their interests. 
• Government has not yet prioritized food safety. 
• Indonesia’s government started to 
recognize the importance of food 
safety with the enforcement of the 
Government Regulation Number 28 of 
2004 on Food Safety, Quality, and 
Nutrition. 
• Food safety is an integral part of food 
security while food security is the 
foundation for food sovereignty. 
• Food industry generally 
has strict food safety 
standards. 
• Government’s control 
over food safety is not 
even; there is a lack of 
control over the small-
scale industry. 
• The government should 
harmonize its food safety 
policy (e.g. the MoA and 
NFDCA) to prevent 
overlapping regulations 
and unnecessary food 
safety inspection. 
Free Trade, WTO, SPS, 
Codex 
• Interviewees working or 
formerly working in the 
Head Office are familiar 
with the WTO, the SPS, 
and the Codex while 
field or laboratory officer 
are not but have a 
general idea about the 
Codex from the 
Regulations of Minister 
of Agriculture.  
• Indonesia must follow 
the WTO rules including 
SPS measures because 
Indonesia has ratified 
the agreement. 
 
• The WTO’s rules limited government capacity to 
regulate their own food system and it might 
hamper the realization of the right to food. 
• Food should not be regulated in the WTO. 
• The WTO promotes free trade which creates 
injustice between members. 
• The WTO purports to respect human rights in 
case of development and poverty alleviation but 
insists on open free trade. 
• The WTO is being ambiguous by respecting 
human rights in the case of development and 
poverty alleviation but insisting open free trade.  
• Some of the interviewees recognized Codex 
and its relationship with food safety but 
admitted that they have limited understanding of 
it. 
• Indonesia must comply with the WTO 
and SPS measures, not just due to its 
legal obligation (ratification) but also 
to gain guaranteed access for export. 
• The Codex is not a harmonized 
standard but based on the reports 
from member countries. Therefore, 
the development of the Codex 
Standards might be heavily influence 
by rich and developed countries. 
• Developed countries have more 
political and economic power and are 
able to direct the policies in an 
international organization such as the 
UN and the WTO. 
  
• Have no knowledge of 
the WTO but heard about 
SPS from quarantine 
regulations (presumably 
respondent 
misunderstands it as one 
of the quarantine 
documents i.e. 
Phytosanitary 
Certificate). 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Topics Government  
food safety officials 
(n=5) 
CSOs 
(n=5) 
University-based food safety experts 
(n=2) 
Importers 
(n=2) 
Free Trade, WTO, SPS, 
Codex (Continued) 
• The WTO roles provide 
guidelines that might 
help Indonesia regulate 
its food policy to fulfill 
the right to food. 
• Neither the WTO nor 
the Codex influence the 
government approach 
on designing food safety 
policies.  
• Indonesia needs to fully 
adopt the Codex 
standards. 
Either:  
1. Claimed that the Codex standards are 
established based on biased science and 
politically negotiated standards (heavily 
influenced by rich countries and private 
sectors); or 
2. The Codex should be followed to promote 
exports. 
• Developing countries should be 
working together to strengthen their 
political power in the Codex, i.e., 
ASEAN countries should harmonize 
their standards and create regional 
standards. 
• For certain products, the Codex might 
give insufficient protection for 
Indonesia 
Importer applies some 
Codex standard as its 
internal standards. 
 
Food Safety Disparity & 
Codex Dual Roles 
Either: 
• Argued that scientific 
justification is a must 
regardless of whether it 
might create a disparity 
of food safety standards 
between the WTO’s 
members. 
• Agreed that the 
scientific justification 
might cause disparity 
but assumed that the 
WTO should be able to 
facilitate fair trade, in 
addition, to protect 
consumer health. 
 
• The WTO rules cause inequality, including 
inequality on the regulation and the 
implementation of food safety standards.  
• CSO respondents either: 
1) Agreed on presumably contradictory nature 
of Codex’s dual roles: protecting consumer 
health and promoting fair trade; or 
2) Assumed that no contradictions in the 
Codex’s roles because of the emphasis on 
fair trade, instead of free trade.  
• The food safety disparity is caused by limited 
capacity and resources to develop adequate 
standards.  
• The Codex’s roles are aligned with 
the objectives of the SPS Agreement, 
although during the implementation, 
Codex’s second role, promoting fair 
trade, is more prioritized. 
• Many international standards favor 
the interests of developed countries.  
• Limited capacity and resources 
hamper the ability of less developed 
countries like Indonesia to provide a 
risk assessment on food safety 
standard development. 
• Adopting higher food safety standard 
from developed countries without 
providing scientific justification is not 
allowed. 
N/A 
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 2.2.3. Food Safety and International Food Trade 
Table 8 above summarizes respondent comments on food safety and trade. 
Regarding food safety and international food trade, both the government officials and 
university-based food safety experts agreed that Indonesia must follow the WTO rules, 
including the SPS measures, because of the obligation from ratifying the WTO trade 
agreement. For example, when asked whether Indonesia must comply with the WTO 
requirements, a government officer responded, “Yes, as WTO member, Indonesia must 
follow all the provisions agreed internationally. Inevitably, Indonesia must follow it, …” 
(PO5, 2018). Wahidin (2018), the food safety expert, commented that in addition to the 
legal obligation, following the WTO rules are important to gain guaranteed access for 
export: 
So, by complying with the WTO, we, quote-unquote, have been guaranteed access for 
export. So, no country can reject food export from Indonesia, since we can argue that 
our food has complied with the international standards, e.g., related to food safety, 
with the Codex you know, like that. So, there are two things you know, first, due to a 
legal obligation, and second, export access ....” (Wahidin, D., 2018). 
Most CSO respondents have the strong opinion that food should not be regulated in 
the WTO. They identified several problematic issues with the WTO and associated free 
trade rules. First, they created inequality between the WTO members due to the nature of 
free trade that focused on the economic aspect. As reported by Abdullah (2018), “… 
because WTO rules are all about the market, and second, it is very monopolistic.” Another 
respondent pointed out the conflicting ideas of free trade and fair trade: “…. but, in fact the 
WTO is not fair trade eh.. but free trade eh. ….With free trade, what happens all the time, is 
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unfair---unfairness. What we called free trade is who is strong he will win” (Jatmiko, T.W., 
2018). Second, the CSO respondents argued that the WTO rules limit the sovereignty of a 
country to develop their own food safety system and hinder the realization of the right to 
food. 
 .... The WTO, for instance, includes the obligation of importing, and the obligation of 
exporting, even if the countries don’t want to export and don’t want to import, they are 
obliged under trade regulation to export a minimum quota and to import a minimum 
quota to guarantee a market for the exporters. It poses, you know, puts the exporters at 
the place that it has more rights than the people who want to eat or to produce the food 
themselves (Valente, F., 2018). 
A similar perspective is presented by Jatmiko (2018): 
I think that the WTO indeed has an ambiguity [internal contradiction]. In some cases, 
it [the WTO], let’s say, respects right --- as human rights --- As I said before if it's 
about development or poverty alleviation. However, if it's not defended by the state, 
our country, for instance, it'll be defeated by articles--- that emphasize on the world 
development--- that you must---must be open. Barriers must be eliminated, despite 
there are articles that talk about the exemption [for developing and least-developed 
countries]. 
Hanim (2018) described an example of how the WTO is affecting the right to food 
primarily for a local farmer in Indonesia. She argued that since Indonesia became a 
member of WTO and ratified the trade agreement, most barriers to trade are being 
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eliminated and the local producers cannot compete with the imported products that are 
heavily subsidized: 
So, the implementation of WTO rules might threaten the realization of the right to 
food in Indonesia. for example, about import measures---Indonesia has been 
importing a lot of soybeans from the USA and other countries, like Brazil and 
Argentina. …. The producers, local producers, were eliminated because the price of 
imported [soybeans] is almost the same [with the local one]. …. Second, imported 
soybeans from the USA are---the production is heavily subsidized, so the actual price 
[cost] is high, but with subsidy, it becomes cheaper. Third, the importers of US 
soybeans are also subsidized. …. So---it's lucrative, and it's hard for local products, 
such as local producers in Indonesia to survive” (Hanim, L., 2018) 
Furthermore, the interviewees responded variously to the question of whether the SPS 
provision regarding scientific justification creates a disparity of food safety standards between 
the WTO’s members. Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the SPS Agreement affirms that members shall 
provide adequate scientific justification when establishing any sanitary or phytosanitary measure, 
including food safety standards. Both government officials’ respondents who are working or had 
formerly worked at the central office in Jakarta agreed that although the SPS requirement might 
cause inequality, it must be fulfilled since Indonesia has ratified the WTO Agreement. However, 
one of them highlighted that the WTO should be able to facilitate fair trade, in addition, to 
protect consumer health: "Yes, indeed there are two---sides, that cause inequality, but it has been 
determined in the WTO that their priorities are to protect consumer health and facilitate fair 
trade" (PO5, 2018).  
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Both CSO respondents and university-based food safety experts concurred that the SPS 
measures create cross-national disparity in the area of food safety, mainly for less developed 
countries7. They believed that many countries, predominantly developed countries, have been 
utilizing food safety measures as a protectionism tool by establishing stringent food safety 
standards. They argued that higher food safety standards might hamper the rights of small 
producers, especially local farmers in the exporting countries. In addition, the food safety expert 
Wahidin (2018) pointed to the political and economic power imbalance between developed and 
less developed countries. These inequalities allow the developed countries to direct the 
development of policies or standards in international organizations, including the WTO, the 
Codex, and even the UN. He provided an example using the case of aflatoxin standard for 
nutmeg: 
For instance, the case of aflatoxin contamination of nutmeg. It became an issue now, 
because there is no international standard yet, right? Right now, it [the standard] is on 
what level yes, the formulation of international [standard] in the Codex. … Indonesia 
as an exporting country of nutmeg in the world is at a disadvantage if for instance, the 
international standard was only based on the EU's opinions. Because if [the 
international standard] was following the rigorous EU standard---the nutmeg farmers 
in Ambon, in Maluku, in---in Papua, they'll be out of business, because their products 
would not be able to enter the EU, could not enter any countries, if the international 
standard was adopting the stringent EU's standard (Wahidin, D.., 2018). 
                                                          
7 Even though this thesis focuses on imports, the disparity in food safety standards also effects Indonesian exports 
and disadvantage, in particular, the economic stability and development of small farmers and their exports 
(Reference: Wahidin & Purnhagen (2018) and interviewees) 
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Some CSO respondents and university-based food safety experts admitted that limited capacity 
and resources prevent a country like Indonesia from developing adequate standards. They also 
argued that the private sector has been lobbying government or international organization and 
influencing food safety policy-making, including in the case of Codex. Valente (2018) claimed 
that the establishment of food safety standards in Codex was influenced by biased science or 
“bought science”; that it is conducted by biased researchers supported by the food industry: 
.... [in] the international code of conduct, you know, the Codex, as we’re talking, there is a  
tiny influence by biased science, I would say, ”bought science”, in a certain way, there is an 
incredible amount of influence of money in buying scientists to use science in order to 
exclude or to include specific producers---that ILSI …. [the] International Life Science 
Institute, was a corporate---kind of front association for the sugar lobby, that did enormous 
amount of research in order to convince the government that sugar was safe, and to convince 
them that meat was not safe, or that animal products were not safe. And they managed to 
bypass an enormous amount to group science that was done, by just dumping the scientific 
journals with a lot of information that was false .... Nowadays it’s harder to do it, but …. It 
still exists and a lot of the criteria by the WTO, the Codex were established by those 
scientists, and many, many, many standards are based on fake [biased] research. 
2.2.4 Food safety regulation for imported fresh agriculture products in Indonesia 
Valente (2018) brought up an interesting point based on his experience working 
with food system actors in New York. According to Valente, most of the stakeholders 
failed to distinguish food sovereignty, food security, and food safety, which affected how 
they developed food policies. 
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We’re discussing about the difference between food security, food sovereignty, and 
food safety. They’re all totally confused about it. Food safety for them --- food 
security is reduced to food safety, they don’t have food security, the word food 
security for them don’t make any sense. They use food security as if it was food 
safety. So, the whole concept of regulation that they have is limited to food safety 
(Valente, F., 2018). 
Meanwhile, in Indonesia’s case, respondents have different opinions on assessing the 
policies of Indonesia’s government on food safety. Hanim (2018) commented on how the 
2012 Food Law has been emphasizing food safety, in addition to food security, rather than 
food sovereignty: “The food law is more about food security and food safety, but the food 
sovereignty is not there. Actually, the Law is a law regarding food supply and food safety”. 
Some, like Sulaeman and Jatwiko, appreciated the stipulation of the Government 
Regulation Number 28 Year 2004 on Food Safety, Quality, and Nutrition. Although they, 
with other respondents, argued that during the implementation, food safety had not yet 
become the main priority for Indonesia’s government. Some also criticized the delay in the 
enforcement of the new Government Regulation on Food Safety, as the derivative of the 
2012 Food Law. As stated in the 2012 Food Law, the new Government Regulation 
supposed to be enforced at least in 2015-2016. For example, as reported by Abdullah 
(2018): "…. Food safety is not yet a priority, as can be seen from the process of preparing 
the Government Regulation for food safety which is slower than other Government 
Regulation (for food security). …. If we ranked it based on the policy and budgeting, food 
security is the highest, food safety in the middle, and food sovereignty is the lowest” 
(Abdullah, S., 2018). 
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Table 9. Summary of Interview Findings D: Food Safety Regulations for Imported 
Products in Indonesia 
Government food safety 
officials 
CSOs University-based food 
safety experts 
Importers 
(n=5) (n=5) (n=2) (n=2) 
• Respondents ether: 
1. think Regime 3 (See 
Chapter 1) is more 
complicated and confusing 
than Regime 1 or 2; or  
2. argued that the latest 
regulation is the most 
suitable mechanism 
because of the risk-based 
inspection scheme but 
agreed that risk 
assessment and adequate 
monitoring are needed. 
• Some prefer Regime 1 as an 
ideal food control mechanism 
due to the simplicity of 
inspection system. 
• The Government should 
develop an adequate 
monitoring system and 
strengthen the capacity of food 
safety laboratories. 
• Indonesia’s government has 
been negotiating food safety 
policy to maintain food 
supply and accommodate 
political commitment., for 
example, in the case of meat 
imports. 
• To improve food safety 
control for imported 
products, Indonesia should 
reduce the number of 
designated entry ports. 
• The Government should 
strengthen food safety 
monitoring, especially in the 
local market place. 
• To increase consumer 
awareness and CSO 
involvement in food safety; 
related issues can be 
synergized with local food 
campaign. 
• Indonesia needs to change 
the paradigm, from end-
product inspection to risk-
based inspection. 
• Indonesia with its limited 
capacities and resources 
should determine the risk 
ranking and conduct a risk 
assessment, in addition to 
conducting law reform. 
• Indonesia may follow 
Malaysia system, using the 
deferral system while 
considering the capacity of 
Indonesia’s farmers to be 
able to follow the regulation.  
• Indonesia should consider 
social and economic 
impacts before adopting a 
higher standard.  
• Importer of fresh 
food for direct 
consumption has no 
complaint and 
obediently follows 
any regulation from 
the government.  
• Importer from food 
industry expressed 
some frustrations 
about the MoA’s food 
safety regulations 
and argued that food 
safety inspection for 
the industrial raw 
material is 
unnecessary and 
overlapping with 
other food safety 
control for processed 
food (by NFDCA). 
 
 
Table 9 above compiles the interviewee's responses concerning the implementation of the 
regulations of Minister of Agriculture on food safety control on the import of fresh agricultural 
products (See Chapter 1). Regarding the implementation of the newest regulation, the Regulation 
of Minister of Agriculture Number 55 of 2016, some field inspectors think that the regulation is 
more complicated and confusing than previous regulations. That is because the list of registered 
laboratories or contaminants keeps changing while the information from the head office is not 
always updated promptly. In contrast, an interviewee in the other quarantine station reported that 
the document inspection under the Regulation of Minister of Agriculture Number 55 of 2016 was 
less demanding: “Yes, certainly we feel it's easier, because we only do verification, or analyzing 
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required document [and are not conducting sampling and laboratory sampling, except for 
monitoring]” (PO1, 2018).  
Compared to the previous regulations in Regime 1 and 2, a government official argued that 
the latest 2016 regulation is the most suitable mechanisms for Indonesia because it adopted the 
risk-based inspection scheme. However, he pointed out the need for a better risk assessment and 
adequate monitoring to support the 2016 regulation: “The point is, the current regulation is 
better, [because] it gives access to countries without recognition or registered laboratories. … 
The [inspection] schemes on previous regulations are different from the current regulation. [The 
recent regulation] is better, more [towards] risk management” (PO5, 2018).  Many government 
officials, however, prefer the food safety control mechanism under the Regulation of Minister of 
Agriculture Number 88 of 2011 as an ideal mechanism due to the simplicity during the 
inspection. For example, as reported by PO1: 
The implementation, right now, it's more---actually, it's easier, it is easier because …. 
when a shipment enters [the port], what's obvious is it's faster, because there's no 
laboratories testing per item, per shipment. It's only monitoring, so from that side 
[time], it's faster (PO1, 2018). 
He continued: “…. about the protection level, better--- the previous regulation is better because 
all goods were being tested first. If we talked about the protection level, eh?” (PO1, 2018).  He 
also added that during the Regime 2 (the Regulation of Minister of Agriculture Number 27 of 
2009 and the Regulation of Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011), the regular sampling 
and laboratory testing at the border provided an incentive for the domestic food safety 
laboratories in Indonesia to improve their capacity on food safety testing. 
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The importers responded differently when asked about the government regulation of food 
safety control on fresh agricultural products. An importer of fresh fruits in Soekarno-Hatta 
airport reported that they have no difficulty complying with food safety requirements from the 
Minister of Agriculture. However, this importer imports relatively small amounts (several tons) 
of fresh fruits such as plums, nectarines, persimmons, strawberries, and cherries and then only 
caters to demands from hotels. In addition, the imports were from countries in which the food 
safety system has been recognized by Indonesia, i.e., Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., 
which means the food safety requirements are comparatively uncomplicated relative to imports 
from most countries. The interviewee from Indonesia Unilever expressed some frustration 
following the food safety regulations. For fresh agricultural products, Indonesia Unilever had 
mainly imported soybeans and tea leaves. They formerly imported tea from African countries 
like Kenya. However, since there is no food safety laboratory in Kenya that is registered by 
Indonesia, Indonesia Unilever decided to change their sources to other countries with more 
developed food safety systems, as she narrates:  
And maybe, actually what makes it complicated is the requirement [in Regime 3] 
that the [foreign] laboratory has to be certified [registered] by the [Indonesian] 
Minister of Agriculture. So, that's what I think made it a little bit difficult for --- 
for us, last time. Because in some areas, like when we want to import from Africa. 
In Africa, there's no laboratory that could meet the requirements (I2, 2018). 
Moreover, Unilever also conveyed its concern that the food safety control for industrial 
raw food materials are being overly and unnecessarily regulated. They argued that a food 
industry as large as Unilever generally has high internal food safety standards, and the raw 
food products are further processed in factories that have been approved by the National 
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Food and Drug Control Agency (NFDCA). Therefore, Unilever argued that in its case, 
prior food safety inspection at the border by the IAQA for industrial raw food materials 
was unnecessary and a double burden.  
Summary of Primary Data Findings 
The interview findings show that there is no consensus between respondents on the 
interpretation of human right to adequate food, food sovereignty, and food security. Government 
officials from IAQA, especially the field inspectors, have a limited understanding of the concept 
of right to food and food sovereignty. Most CSOs seems knowledgeable on the concept of food 
sovereignty but admitts that they have not been focusing on the technical aspects of food trade 
and food safety, particularly for imported fresh products that may be necessary to act on food 
sovereignty issues. University-based food safety experts presented the different insights on the 
terminology of right to food and its correlation to food sovereignty and food security. 
Interestingly, importers from the processed-food industry assumed that the food industry might 
be able to support the realization of the right to adequate food by providing quality food for 
people in Indonesia.  
Moreover, interviewees from IAQA, CSO, and university-based food safety experts 
recognized and acknowledged the disparity of food safety standards between WTO national 
members. They argued that inequalities in available resources and capacity prevent less 
developed countries from establishing adequate food safety standards at national levels. In regard 
to the implementation of the regulations of the Minister of Agriculture on food safety control on 
imported fresh agricultural products in Indonesia, most government field inspectors prefer the 
Regime 1 (the Regulation of Minister of Agriculture Number 27 of 2009 and the Regulation of 
Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011) because the Regime 3 (the Regulation of Minister 
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of Agriculture Number 88 of 2016) is deemed as unfair and more complicated during the 
document inspection at the border. Nevertheless, Regime 3 can be considered more efficient 
because laboratory testing requirements at the port have been reduced for monitoring purposes 
only. Eventually, most interviewees from IAQA (both field and central office officers) agreed a 
better and more adequate monitoring mechanism is needed at the border, particularly one that 
includes risk-based inspection. In order to improve food safety system in Indonesia, university-
based food safety experts in Indonesia recommended that Indonesia’s government strengthen its 
food safety risk assessment and conduct a law reform on food safety. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISCUSSION 
This thesis attempts to present a case study of inequalities in international food trade vis-
à-vis food safety standards and how to tackle the issue by using human rights-based approach 
(HRBA) to food safety and the concept of self-determination, non-discrimination, and equality in 
food sovereignty. At field level, this thesis seeks the most suitable food safety control 
mechanism for imported fresh agri-foods at the border, for Indonesia, that ensure the realization 
of the right to adequate food while maintaining the balance between international trade and 
consumer protection. The finding from secondary data analysis shows the probable case of 
disparity on the national food safety standards between selected WTO members (developed, 
developing, and least-develop countries) notably in establishing maximum residue limit (MRL) 
for pesticide residues. Interviews with 14 respondents from the government, CSOs, academics, 
and private sector (importers) inform the issue around the realization of the right to adequate 
(safe) food in Indonesia, especially for imported fresh agri-food. 
Findings from interviews provide an insight on the realization of the right to adequate 
food in Indonesia, including the implementation of the main principles of the food system in the 
2012 Indonesia Food Law: food sovereignty, food independence/food self-sufficiency, food 
security, and food safety. Most CSOs believe that the interpretation of food sovereignty has been 
reduced by Indonesia’s government to food security, due to lack of understanding on the concept 
of the right to food and food sovereignty, which reflected on the food policy established and 
implemented by the State. In relation to international food trade, most of the respondents 
acknowledged that the disparity of food safety standards between the WTO’s national members 
is caused by lack of capacities and resources. These disadvantages hinder the state’s ability to 
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develop scientific justification as the basis to establish food safety standards. The interview 
findings also discover the lack of attention to food safety as an aspect of the human right to 
adequate food in Indonesia and at the global level. Most CSOs have limited understanding on 
food safety and trade issues while government officials failed to comprehend, much less 
implement, the right to adequate food approach to disentangle food safety issues, especially 
related to global food trade. 
 Furthermore, from the technical side, government food safety officials and importers 
have different opinions on the implementation of technical regulations for food safety at the 
border, i.e., the Regulations of Minister of Agriculture regarding Food Safety Control on 
Imported Fresh Agri-products. Most field inspectors prefer the food safety control mechanism 
under the Regime 1 (Regulation of Minister of Agriculture Number 88 of 2011), which opted for 
a regular inspection scheme, in addition to monitoring (random sampling). Meanwhile, others 
argued that food safety inspection at the border in Indonesia should be based solely on 
monitoring, with the aim of implementing a risk-based inspection approach, and while cutting 
the need for regular sampling and laboratory testing. 
This chapter is divided into three parts: fairness/universality of food safety standards; 
practicality of food system in Indonesia; and challenges to obtain the universality or fairness and 
practicality for food safety control mechanisms at the border in Indonesia. The first part provides 
an overview of the findings from secondary data analysis regarding inequality of food safety 
standards, i.e., Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for pesticide residues; the issues surrounding 
stringency of food safety standards; the food safety trilemma faced by the EU, developed country 
with rigorous food safety standard; and inequality within international food safety standard:  the 
Codex standards. The second part discusses the policy coherence between free trade and food 
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policy in Indonesia with a focus on a human rights analysis including: the realization of right to 
adequate food in Indonesia, the question on whether safe food should be a right or a consumer’s 
choice, and an overview of the right to adequate food, food sovereignty, and food security.  The 
final part explains the challenges in pursuing universal or fairness and practicality for food safety 
control mechanisms at the border in Indonesia; state sovereignty over food safety standards versus 
international trade rules that demand scientific justification that all countries cannot provide; and 
risk-based inspection for imported food. 
3.1. Fairness/Universality of Food Safety Standards 
3.1.1. Inequality in the establishment of food safety standards 
The findings from secondary data analysis indicate that a disparity in food safety 
standards, in this case, MRLs for pesticide residues, between the WTO members, indeed exists. 
All developed countries reviewed (i.e., the EU, the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand/NZ, 
and Japan) establish their own national MRLs and add an extra layer of protection: default 
MRL/positive list or zero tolerance policy. The findings are consistent with the statement from 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) that developed countries have been 
evolving food safety regulatory systems which are increasingly comprehensive (covering more 
food safety attributes, such as adding more food safety hazards) and rigorous (establishing higher 
standards for those hazards (Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, & Robinson, 2003). As predicted by IFPRI, 
over time food safety standards continue to become increasingly demanding and influence the 
exports and food markets of developing countries (Diao et al., 2003).  Josling, Roberts & Orden 
(2004) reported that the strictness of regulations tends to increase among wealthier countries and 
a study by Li, Xiong, & Beghin  (2014) also found that countries with larger national income and 
bigger populations adopt stricter food safety standards. Rigid food safety standards can be 
 
104 
 
motivated by growing concerns about food safety from consumers and the public or lobbying 
efforts from domestic agricultural industries (Li et al., 2014) 
Many interviewees from CSOs argued that developed countries have been using food 
safety as a protectionist tool and the stringency of their food safety standards could hamper the 
right of small local producers. Some studies echoe the argument that stringent food safety 
standards are usually utilized as a disguised trade barrier and protectionism (Carrère, DeMaria, & 
Droguè, 2018; Curzi, Luarasi, Raimondi, Olper, & Curzi, 2018; Foletti & Shingal, 2014; Li & 
Beghin, 2012, 2014). Rigorous food safety standards can serve at least two purposes for 
exporting countries that have stringent MRLs:  protecting the health of their people and 
increasing the competitiveness of their producers while extending their market access to other 
countries with lower standards (Foletti & Shingal, 2014; Li et al., 2014). On the other hand, 
limited access to scientific and technical expertise and information that is needed to meet new 
and higher provisions put developed countries at a disadvantage (Hanak, Boutrif, Fabre, & 
Pineiro, 2002). In addition, the fixed costs of following international trade standards (such as the 
Codex) provide more opportunities for established exporters and lead to a decrease of the 
developing-country export compared to those in developed countries (Unnevehr & Ronchi, 
2014). 
 Li & Beghin (2012) used MRLs data in plant and animal products to examine the 
impacts of stringency of MRLs above international standards (such as the Codex standards) on 
trade flows between trading countries, i.e., the U.S. and Canada. Using score indices of MRL 
stringency (that they developed in their previous research), they measured countries’ strictness in 
MRLs corresponding to the Codex levels for each product (Li & Beghin, 2012). Their study 
showed that MRL stringency in an average importing country has the tendency to reduce its 
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imports, albeit weakly and that the MRL stringency in an average exporting country significantly 
enhances its exports performance (Li & Beghin, 2012). Through implementing stricter and 
higher MRLs than Codex, Canada seems to increase their producer’s competitiveness, at least 
due to two main reasons: by complying with a higher standard at home, the Canadian exporters 
(a) can avoid rejections and refusals from the importing country’s partner and (b) develop their 
reputation in international markets, resulting in a higher premium or recurring purchase. A 
similar study by Foletti & Shingal (2012, 2014, 2015) reported that higher food safety standards 
provide an incentive for farmers in the exporting countries to improve their agricultural practices 
which positively increases the export value. 
Adopting stricter food safety standards, including MRLs, provides many benefits for the 
exporting country. However, as discussed before in Chapter 1. Literature Review, alongside its 
positive influence on the right to health such as providing better protection for the consumers in 
the importing countries and improving the right to adequate livelihood or work through higher 
export performances, SPS measures (e.g., food safety standard) create a vastly problematic issue 
for the exporting countries (Joseph, 2011). Among other things, the uneven stringency of food 
standards operates as a disguised trade barrier that can threaten the realization of human rights 
(right to adequate livelihood, right to work, and right to food) for people in the exporting 
countries with lower food safety standards (Joseph, 2011).  
3.1.2. Food Safety Trilemma 
 Bernauer & Caduff (2003) explain the challenge faced by the European Union in defending 
their regulatory stringency in food safety and how that stringency creates a food safety trilemma. 
The trilemma is described as a difficult choice from three options (food safety, subsidiarity, and 
market efficiency) that the E.U. government must make to manage food safety policies. They 
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argued that the stringency of food safety standards in the EU has been increasing due to (a) low 
domestic consumer trust  in the current food safety system of the EU and its member countries and 
(b) the multi-level and decentralized governance structure of food safety system in the EU. 
Bernauer & Caduff (2003) concluded that trade harmonization could be achieved at any level of 
stringency depending on how every stakeholder can come to an agreement. They describe the food 
safety trilemma (Figure 8.) as the result of the escalating stringency of food safety regulations in 
the E.U.  
Figure 8. Food Safety Trilemma (Bernauer & Cauff, 2003) 
 
The food safety trilemma is characterized by trade-offs between subsidiarity (multi-level and 
decentralized governance), market efficiency, and food safety (Bernauer & Caduff, 2003). The 
main objective of the principle of subsidiarity is to ensure a degree of independence for a lower 
authority in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to the central government 
(Panniza, 2018). The subsidiarity principle, as explained in the Treaty on European Union, 
defines “the circumstances in which it is preferable for action to be taken by the Union, rather 
than the Member States, in areas in which the European Union does not have exclusive 
competence” (Panniza, 2018). 
 
107 
 
Policy-makers can gain optimal results only on two of these three dimensions: 
a. When subsidiarity and food safety are maximized, it might lessen the efficiency in markets, 
particularly in the form of market protection and market concentration (implemented by EU).  
b. Maximizing subsidiarity and market efficiency (lower market concentration and less 
protection/restriction) can decrease the level of food safety.  
c. A centralization of food governance, including low subsidiarity, is required to create the desired 
result: maximizing food safety and reducing market inefficiency (Bernauer & Caduff, 2003). 
Bernauer & Caduff (2003) suggested that the EU shift their policy into a higher degree of 
centralization of food safety governance to reduce market inefficiencies and to increase food 
safety in the EU. The concept of food safety trilemma can be applied to a more global discourse, 
where subsidiarity can be seen as the nexus of public policy making (including public and CSO 
participation) that can affect the balance between food safety policy (public health protection) 
and market efficiency (ensuring fair trade). 
 
3.1.3. Inequality within International Food Safety Standards, the Codex: conflict of interest 
and inequality on Codex standard-setting  
In an effort to prevent protectionism and minimalize trade barriers, the WTO promotes 
the harmonization of SPS measures including food safety standards by encouraging State 
members to adopt food safety measures developed by the international organization, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission/CAC (“SPS Agreement,” 1995). This inclusion gives legal and 
economic authority to Codex to regulate international food safety standards, which is a shift from 
their previous entirely voluntary nature (Livermore, 2006). With the implementation of the SPS 
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Agreements, the Codex started to carry legal consequences for WTO members and began to have 
a more significant role economically in the global trade system (Livermore, 2006; Ni, 2013). 
According to Veggeland and Brogen (2005), the “semi-binding legal framework” of the 
Codex indicates that “there are now some ill-defined legal consequences imposed for the 
member states that deviate from or do not adhere to Codex standards and principles” (p.689). Ni 
(2013) explained that adopting Codex into national or regional regulations may provide benefits, 
for example: (i) for importing countries, it might prevent disputes with their trading partners, and 
(ii) for exporting countries, if they are implementing the Codex standard, the burden to provide 
scientific justification of a certain food safety measure will lay on states that adopt stringent 
standards than Codex. Horton (2001) agreed that the inclusion of Codex as acceptable standards 
in the SPS agreement provides an incentive for WTO members to adopt the Codex standards 
because they do not have to justify the standards; they are adopting the international norm. While 
developed countries can establish their own higher food safety standards, developing countries 
are left with the choice of adopting Codex or establishing their own standard.  
In 2002, FAO/WHO evaluated how well Codex standards were working and summarized 
the members’ responses on the importance of different types of Codex standard to their countries 
(Table 10) as reported by Trail et al. (20028). State members at all stages of development (low, 
middle, and high-income countries) valued all type of Codex standards. Nevertheless, high-
income countries put less importance on commodity or product standards, quality descriptors, 
and processes and procedures which is probably because they already have their own higher 
standards (Trail et al., 2002). As can be seen from Table 10, most countries view the Codex 
standard as valuable to facilitate food exports and ensure the safety of food import.  
                                                          
8 Newer reference on the evaluation of the Codex standards is not avaailable. 
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Table 10. In which ways are Codex Standards important to your country? (Trail et al., 2002) 
 
Based on interviews and literature review in this study, there are several criticisms related 
to the growing authority of the Codex as the international food safety standard in global trade: (a) 
the dualism of Codex’s main rules; (b) the impartiality of Codex standards; and (c) the inequality 
on Codex standard-setting process. The Codex has two main objectives as stated in an article in 
the Statutes: protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade 
(FAO/WHO 2001, 4). These objectives are to be taken into consideration by the Codex when 
developing and promoting international food standards (Veggeland & Borgen, 2005).  
The common critique regarding Codex’s dual roles is that “it favors trade liberalization 
over health, industry concern over consumers’ and rich countries over poor ones” (Halabi, 2015, 
p. 407). According to Halabi (2015), “from its structure to its purpose, Critic” (Post, 2005) and 
Fortin (2017) also agreed that the intended dualism of Codex objectives forfeits public health 
protection in place of greater support for trade. An interviewee from a CSO, a human right 
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expert, Valente (2018) and the food safety expert, Wahidin (2018) raised the same concern 
regarding the integrity of Codex standards and how the Codex standard making process has been 
heavily influenced by rich and developed countries.  
Valente (2018) argued that transnational corporations have been funding research 
institutions such as the International Life Science Institute (ILSI) to develop a biased science to 
accommodate their interest. ILSI has been providing substantial resources for many regulatory 
bodies including the Joint WHO/FAO Expert Committee on Food Additives and the European 
Food Safety Authority (Halabi, 2015). Halabi (2015) explained that studies and analyses of 
Codex decision-making processes often criticized that Codex has been “subordinating its agenda 
to industry interest.” Those criticisms are mostly proven indirectly by examining the number of 
industry representatives on Codex meetings or as part of state delegations (Halabi, 2015). 
However, he argued that the heavy involvement of the food industry in Codex making processes, 
either as part of national delegation or as observers, is not the main concern, but 
echoingValente’s argument, the actual threat to the Codex integrity is “through hidden efforts to 
influence scientists supplying Codex’s committees and subcommittees with purportedly 
objective information” (Halabi, 2015). In a parallel observation on the pharmaceutical industry, 
Bailey (2008), who wrote about conflicts of interest in the pharmaceutical industry, denounced 
the accusation that the collaboration or association between researchers and this industry can 
create “conflict of interest that is significantly distorting scientific research, harming consumers 
and patients, or misleading public policy.” He claimed that “contrary to the claims of conflicts of 
interest activists, the overwhelming majority of patients and research subjects are not being 
harmed, public trust in scientists and scientific research remains extremely high, and new drugs 
not only save lives but money” (Bailey, 2008).  
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The interview findings (Chapter 2, Table 8) demonstrate that most interviewees from 
among the Indonesia government officials support the recommendation to fully adopt Codex as 
national food safety standard because they considered it as a part of the legal obligations of 
Indonesia from when it ratified the WTO Agreement. Another justification to support Codex as 
expressed by some CSO respondents is that adopting the Codex can promote exports, which 
conforms with the result from Table 10 above. Nevertheless, Wahidin (2018) pointed out the 
unbalanced economic and political power between developed and developing countries creating 
inequalities in the development of Codex standards. According to Winickoff & Bushey (2010), 
there are two groups who regularly have limited participation on risk discourse on Codex’s 
standard-setting: “[a] developing countries due to the lack of access to measurement equipment 
and other technologies of quantification and [b] consumers due to difficulties framing cultural, 
religious, and other concerns not strictly related to safety and consumers” (p.364). 
As reported by FAO/WHO in their “2002 Report of the Codex Alimentarius and other 
FAO and WHO Food Standards Work”, many developing and poorer countries feel difficulty in 
raising their involvement and influence in Codex (Trail et al., 2002). Limited financial resources 
have been highlighted by developing and less developed countries as the overwhelming barrier 
to higher participation in Codex meetings; ninety percent of low-income countries and eighty-
seven percent of middle-income countries had less participation than they would like due to the 
cost of participation  (Trail et al., 2002; Livermore, 2006). Governments from low-income 
countries usually put less priority on attending Codex meetings. Halabi (2015) mentioned that 
Codex had been criticized for “undertaking its work with insufficient participation by developing 
countries or [with] inadequate sensitivity to their resource constraints.” However, he argued that 
the main concern from developing countries is not the limited participation, but the insistence 
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from a developed country on imposing higher or stricter standards than Codex adopts or the 
country’s approval of private sector efforts to effectively raise standards higher through supply 
agreements (Halabi, 2015). 
 The disparity on political and financial power between developed rich countries and 
developing and less-developed countries as mentioned by Wahidin (2018), is in line with 
Halabi’s argument: 
Codex is managed and funded by wealthy countries that have a significant interest in 
what it declares to be international standards that both protect consumers and facilitate 
trade. Whether intentionally or not, the standards promoted by these countries necessarily 
impose resource barriers to low- and middle-income countries and even participation in 
Codex processes can cost prohibitive (Halabi, 2015).  
In general, several characteristics of the Codex such as distinct inequalities among the 
participants, limited procedural protections for minority positions and overrepresentation for 
industry and state interests result in the difficulty on making robust deliberation in the Codex  
(Trail et al., 2002; Halabi, 2015; Livermore, 2006; Ni et al., 2013).  
3.2. The practicality of food system in Indonesia: Policy coherence between free trade and 
food policy in Indonesia.  
3.2.1. The Realization of Right to Adequate Food in Indonesia 
 In November 2013, twelve Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) including Indonesia 
Global Justice (IGJ) and People’s Coalition on Food Sovereignty/Koalisi Rakyat untuk 
Kedaulatan Pangan (KRKP) filed a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court of Indonesia in an 
attempt to protest several articles in the 2012 Food Law, which are considered contrary to the 
Constitution and a deterrent to the fulfillment of the right to food in Indonesia, including the 
right to safe food (Secretariat General of The Constitution Court, 2013). Several concerns related 
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to the right to food and food safety were raised, such as the Food Law’s Article 3 and Article 36. 
According to the CSOs, those articles are deterring the realization of the right to food and lead to 
the inconclusiveness of state’s responsibility and accountability to fulfill its obligation to 
Indonesia people (IGJ, 2014).  The twelve CSOs  criticized the phrase “to fulfill basic human 
need” in Article 3 of the 2012 Food Law: “The practical management of food governance 
(penyelenggaraan pangan) is implemented to fulfill a basic human need that provides equal, 
prevalent, and sustainable benefits based on Food Sovereignty, Food Self-Sufficiency, and Food 
Security” (Indonesia Food Law, 2012), as unconstitutional. They reasoned that the phrase does 
not elaborate the right to an adequate standard of living as stated in Article 11 the ICESCR: “The 
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions”(Secretariat General of The Constitution Court, 
2013).   
 The CSOs contended that despite declaring food as a human right, in the section "In 
view of", the 2012 Food Law does not mention the Law Number 11 of 2005 on the Ratification 
of the ICESCR and no definition of the right to food is included in the General Provision 
(Secretariat General of The Constitution Court, 2013). The CSOs argued that the lack of a 
reference to Indonesia’s ratification of the ICESCR and its foundation for the right to food in the 
2012 Food Law could prevent the state from being held accountable for their failure to fulfill 
their obligation to realize the right to food. However, the Court disagreed and asserted that the 
phrase "basic human needs" does not need to be interpreted differently because the phrase "basic 
human needs" includes clothing, food, and shelter (housing). This corresponds, argued the Court, 
to provisions in Article 11 of the ICESCR, as has been ratified by Law Number 11 of 2005, 
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which basically states that basic human needs are not only concerning food but also includes 
clothing and housing (Secretariat General of The Constitution Court, 2013). 
 The legal requirement for food imports in Indonesia is articulated in the 2012 Food 
Law, Article 36, as follows: 
Paragraph 1. Food import shall only be done if domestic food production is insufficient 
and/or (the food) cannot be produced domestically. 
Paragraph 2. Food import shall only be done if domestic food production and the 
National Food Reserve is insufficient. 
Paragraph 3. The (supply) sufficiency of domestic staple food production and national 
food reserve is decided by a minister or government institution who is responsible for 
conducting state tasks in the food sector. 
The CSOs argued that Article 36 creates ambiguity in the responsibility or authority of the state 
(ministry/government institution) as stated in paragraph 3 and requires no participation from the 
community in deciding to import or not. The IGJ (2014) interpreted the article as if deemed 
necessary, the state has the right to open import floodgates on the basis of fulfilling the domestic 
food supply, and they perceived that this would disadvantage small farmers. Interestingly, 
contrary to the CSO’s view, Anderson (2013), in his report for Indonesia Ministry of Trade 
through the USAID SADI (Support for Economic and Analysis Development in Indonesia) 
Project,  argued that based on the 2012 Food law, restricting food imports and exports has 
become one of the main policy instruments for the government to achieve the Law’s objectives 
of boosting food production and self-sufficiency over the long term. He asserted that although 
import restrictions increase the producer price and promote more local production (which 
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increases the welfare of net sellers), they benefit primarily the larger producers (Anderson, 
2013). 
 The Constitutional Court  (2013) responded that the CSOs misunderstood the Article 
and assessed the Law noncomprehensively (Secretariat General of The Constitution Court, 
2013). The court pointed out that there will be a further procedure to establish an independent 
food institution that includes the regulation of the duties and authority of the food institution as 
stated in Articles 126-129. Therefore, the CSOs’ concern is groundless (Secretariat General of 
The Constitution Court, 2013). However, as pointed out by several interviewees, the 2012 Food 
Law mandates that the government institution to handle the food sector was being established 
through Presidential Decree, within three years from the promulgation of the Law, but until now, 
that directive has not been fulfilled.  
According to Abdullah (2012), the 2012 Food Law articulates many obligations and 
responsibilities on the part of the state but provides no legal basis or framework to ensure that the 
State can be held accountable and that people have access to effective remedy whenever their 
rights are violated. As stated by FAO (2006), “only with enforceable justice, trusted institutions 
and a legal system oriented towards the human right to food will rights-holders be in a position 
to hold duty-bearers accountable for guaranteeing food security (p.13).” Moreover, the 
implementation of the right to food should be directed at food access, the adequacy and 
sustainability of food availability and access, and rights holders’ participation and sovereignty in 
food-related policy (IGJ, 2014). Abdullah (2012) contended that in general, even though the 
2012 Food Law has included the right to food and food sovereignty in its discourse, the State still 
views food as a “commodity” which should be ensured through a market mechanism. As 
reported by an interviewee from Indonesia Berseru, Tejo Waluyo (2018), the Indonesia 
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government has been focusing on the production of food, not the producers (farmers) 
themselves. Farmers are perceived as the object, and not the subject, of food production. For 
example, the implementation of 2012 Food Law continues to neglect the dimension of access to 
food production resources (such as land, water, seed, technology, and financial) (Waluyo, 2018). 
This approach focuses on maximizing production instead of providing human rights based policy 
attention to resource access; it thereby ignores equity issues in food production and inevitably 
disadvantages smaller farmers.  
3.2.2. Safe food: a right or a choice? 
Hanak et al. (2002) discussed the ethical and practical considerations of “marketing” food 
safety in developing countries. From an ethical perspective, safe food is a right for everyone, and 
food safety is considered a public good. Therefore the fulfillment of the right to safe food shall 
be guaranteed by the state. On the practical side, consumers are seen as individuals who have the 
responsibility to choose for themselves, i.e., whether they want to buy foods that are more or less 
safe, and thus, food safety is ensured through a market mechanism (Hanak et al., 2002). This 
discourse emerged from at least two arguments. First, food safety is a complex issue where (a) 
“safe” and “unsafe” might not be exclusively distinguishable: for most food contaminants, the 
acceptable tolerance level might be different depending on the daily intake and type of food 
preparation, and (b) strengthening food safety incurs additional cost (Hanak et al., 2002). 
Following those arguments, some economists reasoned that consumers should have a choice in 
determining the level of safety they want (and are willing to pay for), which might be lower than 
the safety level established by the government (Antle, 1995 in Hanak et al., 2002).  However, 
Malayang (nd) in Hanak, et al. (2002) pointed out that in a market that divided food into 
different safety levels, poor people with lower purchasing power will end up consuming mainly 
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the unsafe food, which rationally would be the cheapest food. Therefore, in that case, food safety 
is no longer a matter of individual choice, but merely one of the personal constraints and the state 
has an obligation to provide a public guarantee of food safety standards (Hanak et al., 2002). 
Second, developing countries have a practical constraint to ensure safe food:  limited resources 
and the vulnerable nature of food supply chain hinder the ability of the government to enforce 
minimum standards effectively (Hanak et al., 2002). 
Similar practical constraints were addressed by an interviewee from the Indonesia Global 
Justice (IGJ), Hanim (2018). She argued that Indonesia’s government sometimes negotiates food 
safety policy to maintain food supply and accommodate political commitment (Hanim, 2018). 
One example is in the case of livestock (beef) imports, where the government developed a new 
import policy to ensure the sustainable supply of beef as one of the strategic (important) food 
commodities in Indonesia. When Indonesia’s government tried to reduce the retail price of beef 
down to Rp 80,000 (US$ 6) per kilogram, beef consumption became a highly politicized public 
debate with one of the main issues being that the policy would reduce incentives for local 
livestock farmers and cattle ranchers to increase their production and productivity (Arifin, 
Achsani, Martianto, Sari, & Firdaus, 2018). 
In 2016, the Government Regulation Number 04 was imposed to support the political-
driven policy to achieve meat self-sufficiency in 2017 by altering the animal quarantine 
regulation on quarantine zone, from country-based to zone-based as an attempt to increase the 
cattle population in Indonesia (Achmad, Putriana, Nabila, Sari & Bumantara, 2016). Quarantine 
zones are created to prevent contagious livestock diseases like foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 
and an infectious zoonotic disease: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, mad cow disease) 
from entering into and spreading throughout Indonesia. The country-based policy required the 
 
118 
 
whole area of an exporting country to be free from FMD and BSE. On the other hand, the zone-
based policy relaxes the disease-free requirement to selected zones in the exporting country. 
Under the zone-based policy, Indonesia will be able to import cows from countries like India and 
Brazil that have not been free from both diseases, as long as they originate from areas in 
countries that are free of disease. Presently, Australia has been the main source of cow 
importation under the country-based policy (Achmad et al., 2016). From a financial perspective, 
the zone-based policy might provide an additional source of livestock and beef supply for 
Indonesia which could reduce the beef price in the domestic market (Achmad et al., 2016). 
However, the risk of FMD and BSE outbreak will be increased. In addition, lower beef prices 
can disadvantage the local farmers (Achmad et al., 2016).  
3.2.3. Right to adequate food, food sovereignty and food security in Indonesia 
 As shown in the above cases, Indonesia's government and CSOs have different 
interpretations of the 2012 Food Law, specifically regarding the right to food and food 
sovereignty. Even though most interviewees from CSOs appreciated the Indonesian 
government’s willingness to include the right to food and food sovereignty in the 2012 Food 
Law, they argued that the implementation is still far from their expectations. Most respondents 
from Indonesia’s CSOs claimed that the Indonesia government failed to comprehend, much less 
implement, the right to food and food sovereignty, let alone the right to adequate food. At the 
same time, CSO respondents admitted their limited understanding of or involvement in food 
safety issues, especially related global food trade. Meanwhile, the interview findings show that 
only a few government officials had any familiarity with the right to adequate food and food 
sovereignty, and no one had profound insight into those issues.  
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 The main criticisms from CSO respondents concern how the government, through their 
food policies, has been conflating the concept of food sovereignty to the administration of food 
security during the implementation of the 2012 Food Law. Wahidin (2018) pointed out that the 
verbatim international definition of the right to food is analogous to the international definition 
of food security. The CESCR in the General Comment 12, stated that: “The right to adequate 
food is realized when every man, woman, and child, alone or in community with others, has 
the physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its 
procurement”, and the definition of food security on the World Food Summit in 1996 is “Food 
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life”.  
Contrary to the opinion of CSO respondents, another interviewee, a food safety expert, 
Wahidin (2018) considered the adaption of the right to food in the 2012 Food Law to lean 
considerably toward food sovereignty. Wahidin (2018) argued that CSOs transfigured the right 
to food concept into food sovereignty, but with the difficulty and there has not been a consensus 
on a formal, public, and institutional definition of food sovereignty: 
The right of people to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute, 
and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of 
markets and corporations (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007). 
Meanwhile the 2012 Food Law describes food sovereignty as: “The right of the state and nation 
to independently establish food policy that guarantees the right to food for the people and to 
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grant the right to the society to establish a food system that is appropriate to the available local 
potential resources” (Indonesia’s Food Law, 2012). 
According to Gordillo & Jerónimo (2013), the food sovereignty and food security 
concept are often employed interchangeably in Indonesia, particularly in the new regulation. 
However, the concept of food sovereignty seems to be used “when referring to the central power 
of a state (understood as the representative of the people) to be able to define its food policy 
without external interference” (Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013, p.6). On the other hand, the food 
security concept is defined as “a multidimensional concept to support the fight against hunger 
and the enjoyment of balanced nutrition,” referring to the FAO definition, (Gordillo & Jerónimo, 
2013, p.6). The ambiguity of the food sovereignty definition is addressed by Patel (2009): “food 
sovereignty is, if anything, over defined” since the concept has many versions of meaning. He 
added that “since food sovereignty is a call for people’s rights to shape and craft food policy, it 
can hardly be surprising that this right is not used to explore and expand the covering political 
philosophy.” Gordillo & Jerónimo (2013) suggested that the food sovereignty concept causes 
semantic and political difficulties for some countries and relate, for example, that a senior Latin 
American official raised a suspicion that food sovereignty was created to develop policies 
restricting international trade, investment flows or patent recognition:  
If we already have a broad consensus on the concept of food security at an 
intergovernmental level, what is the goal of those who are proposing a new concept of 
food sovereignty? In practical terms, what is gained from this? There is a suspicion that 
behind it there could be policies restricting international trade, investment flows or patent 
recognition. We should consider that these questions must have clear answers before any 
debate or adoption of the concept (Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013, p. 10). 
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Gordillo & Jerónimo (2013) explained the principal differences between food sovereignty 
and food security concepts and their implications for national public policies. The similarities of 
food sovereignty and food security are: (a) both concepts highlight the necessity to boost food 
production and productivity to ensure the food availability for the future; (b) both concepts 
emphasize food access as the main issue, and therefore involves redistributive public policies on 
income and employment; (c) both concepts also consider the important connection between food 
and nutrition; and (d) both concepts provide for increases to social protection to solve temporary 
crises or conditional cash transfer programs as part of principal programs to end poverty 
(Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013).  
Gordillo & Jerónimo (2013) summarized two key differences between food sovereignty 
and food security. First, they claimed that 
the concept of food security --adopted by FAO member states--is somehow neutral since 
in terms of power relations. It does not prejudge the concentration of economic power in 
the different links of the food chain and in the international food trade, or the ownership 
of key means of production such as land, or more contemporarily, access to information 
(Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013). 
In contrast, Gordillo & Jerónimo (2013) explained that the food sovereignty concept starts 
precisely by recognizing the power asymmetry in the several markets involved and the different 
spheres of powered involved in food, including in the area of multilateral trade agreements. In 
addition, under food sovereignty, democratic states are expected to address the inequalities and 
food is treated as more than just a commodity.  
Patel (2009) considered that the food security definition is intentionally avoiding 
discussing the social control of the food system, which from the state’s perspective is good 
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diplomatically because there is no specification on how to implement food security (p. 665). 
Patel (2009) argued that food sovereignty was identified as a precondition to genuine food 
security by La Via Campesina in 1996. The second main difference between both concepts is 
regarding food production, how food is produced (Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013). According to 
Gordillo & Jerónimo (2013) Food security has been focusing on three main technological 
patterns in food production: (a) industrial agriculture with intensive use of fossil fuels (b) 
biological agriculture, using biomass and biotechnology (Genetic Modified Organism/GMO), 
and (c) organic agriculture, which includes certification processes. On the other side, food 
sovereignty is obviously focused mainly on non-industrial, small-scale agriculture, preferably 
organic, with the agro-ecology concept (Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013). Gordillo & Jerónimo 
(2013) proposed integration of food sovereignty in two ways:  
(a) as the capacity of states to define their own food policies autonomously, and 
(b) as a policy option biased in favor of small-scale agriculture — with the right to food and 
the human rights discourse, with FAO’s concept of food security playing the role of a 
discursive anchor or holdfast (Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013, p.11). 
Furthermore, they suggested linking food security with development and human rights which can 
only be accomplished by assuming the freedom of governments to define their own food policies 
(Gordillo & Jerónimo, 2013). FAO (2006) in the Right to Food in Practice: Implementation at 
the National Level explained that “a human rights-based approach relies on a dual strategy of 
strengthening the capacity of duty-bearers to carry out their obligations while equally focusing 
on assisting communities and rights-holders to empower themselves and demand accountability” 
(FAO, 2006, p.6). Increasing awareness and education on the right to food for both the state as 
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duty-bearer and the communities is important for the realization of the right to food ((FAO, 
2006, p.6).  
According to Grace (2017), there are potential trade-offs between food safety and 
availability (Grace, 2017), or food security. In most developing countries, most nourishing foods 
such as eggs, green leafy vegetables and fish but also presumably high-risk fresh foods are sold 
at the traditional markets (Grace, 2017). Measures intended to improve the safety of food may 
have the unintended consequence of reducing its availability or the access of people to nutritious 
food, for example, in Kenya, pasteurized milk costs twice than raw milk, limiting the access for 
many poor families (Grace, 2017). Therefore, as above, addressing food safety as a subset or a 
condition of the right to food must balance the obligations of duty-bearers to meet public health 
obligations while not disempowering individuals’ and communities’ capacities to feed 
themselves adequately and sustainably. 
In order to develop a more inclusive and comprehensive food safety policy, it is important 
to balance the level of awareness and knowledge between government and CSOs. The FAO 
(2006) pointed out the need to leverage awareness of, and increase education on, the right to food 
for both the state as duty-bearer and the communities. In addition, CSOs need to improve their 
knowledge and involvement in the area of food safety and global trade issues; this is critical to 
promote rights holders’ participation in food-related policy. 
3.3. Challenges in obtaining the universality or fairness and practicality for food safety 
control mechanism at the border in Indonesia. 
Inequality of food safety standards can be considered as an inequality of the protection level 
for public health. Therefore a fair and practical universal minimum standard should be established 
and implemented. However, the main question is which standard should be used? The harmonized 
standard from Codex, the standards from the prominent developed countries (such as Japan, the 
 
124 
 
E.U., the U.S, etc.) or the transnational private standard? Or, should a universal standard exist at 
all? The first part of this chapter showed how the developed countries gain social, economic, and 
trade advantages through their ability to set higher and stricter standards without the struggle of 
providing scientific justification. The question on Codex’s integrity as the international food safety 
standard recognized by WTO was also explored. Codex standards are allegedly impartial (neutral). 
They fail, however, to minimize the unequal capacity between developed and developing (and 
less-developed) countries to set standards. Imbalanced national power is complicated by the ability 
of large-scale corporate interests to influence standard-setting in Codex. If developing and less-
developed countries cannot rely on the international standard, Codex, while on the other hand, they 
do not have the capacity to develop scientific justification to establish their own national standard, 
should they be allowed to adopt the higher standard from developed countries? 
Several points need to be addressed if developing and less developed countries want to adopt 
the stringent standards implemented by developed countries. First, can developing and least-
developed countries adopting food safety standards from developed countries without providing 
their own risk analysis as scientific justification. Second, is it really necessary to adopt higher 
standards? As shown in Chapter 2. Findings Part 1, several developing countries with middle or 
low income such as Malaysia, South Africa, and Thailand have been adopting the deferral path 
and default Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) system for their national food safety standard. South 
Africa is aiming higher and developed a deferral policy by adopting three layers of measures: the 
EU MRLs, the Codex MRLs, and default MRL. South Africa’s deferral policy, as can be seen 
from Figure 6, provides an outnumbered quantity of MRLs which sometimes exceed the number 
of MRLs established by the EU. However, the rationale as to how those countries are able to adopt 
other countries’ standards without providing their own scientific justification is still unclear and 
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left unanswered, since the author was not able to find any WTO dispute settlement cases regarding 
this issue.  
Some developing countries such as China, Brazil, Paraguay, and India had protested Japan’s 
policy to adopt default MRL system. China had been actively questioning Japan’s plan to 
implement a positive list system since 2005 (WTO, 2006). On 29 May 2006, even though China 
challenged the policy, Japan decided to apply the default MRL (WTO, 2006). Japan responded 
that the default MRL of 0.001 pm had been set, based on the patterns of the food consumption of 
the Japanese population and established through a globally accepted approach that is consistent 
with WTO requirements (WTO, 2006). During the Meeting of the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (WTO) on 23-24 June 2009, Brazil and China raised their concern that 
“Japan's uniform standard of 0.01 ppm (default MRL) for several pesticides was arbitrary and 
without scientific justification” (WTO, 2009). China also requested that Japan harmonize its 
standard with the relevant international standards and ensure that the rule is applied equally for 
imported and domestic products (WTO, 2009). Japan argued that they had met the SPS 
requirement since the default MRL was based on scientific assessment, considered Codex, and 
other international standards, and applied for both imported and domestic products (WTO, 2009). 
In 2010, China repeated their effort to challenge the default MRL policy but which was 
deflected by Japan with a compelling argument: “The representative of Japan responded that its 
Positive List system (default MRL) had been established in 2006 after consulting existing MRLs 
from Codex, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the European Union and the United States 
(developed countries that have been adopting the same standard), based on a scientific evaluation.” 
Paraguay, in the 2011 SPS Committee Meeting, also expressed their concern that Japan’s default 
MRL was affecting their export of sesame (WTO, 2011). Another intriguing argument by Japan is 
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about how they argued that the EU has been using the same standard: “The European Union also 
imposed the same uniform limit (Default MRL of 0.01 ppm)” (WTO, 2011). Japan likewise 
reiterated its justification that the limit of 0.01 ppm is the level at which it is unlikely to cause harm 
to human health, based on the concept of acceptable exposure established by Joint FAO/WHO 
Expert Committee on Food Additives/JECFA (WTO, 2011).  
When asked whether it is permissible for Indonesia to adopt other country’s MRLs standard, 
including default MRL, Wahidin (2018) pointed out that Article 5 Paragraph 7 in the SPS 
Agreement might be the answer:  
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally 
adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent 
information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, 
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within 
a reasonable period of time (The SPS Agreement, Art. 5, para. 7; highlight applied by 
author). 
However, he explained that several constraints prevent Indonesia from using the provision 
quoted above. First, the adoption of other WTO members’ SPS standards, on the argument of 
safeguarding public health, will more likely be supported if there is clear evidence of a country’s 
legal obligation to do so. Wahidin (2018) recommends that Indonesia must adopt the 
precautionary principle in its Food Law so that Indonesia has the legal basis to apply the 
precautionary principles (See Literature Review) as scientific justification to adopt default MRL. 
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Second, the measure can only be implemented temporarily, until additional evidence for better 
risk assessment (risk analysis) is found.  
3.3.1. State sovereignty, right to food, and international rules on food safety standards 
In addition to international trade, another fundamental force in the international 
governance of the global food system, is human rights, particularly the right to adequate food 
(Allain, 2018). In the past, the right to adequate food was traditionally utilized to tackle issues of 
hunger and lack of access to quantity of food, however, lately, there is a shifting of the discourse 
to quality issues of food supply, including food safety (Allain, 2018). According to Downes 
(2014) in The Impact of WTO SPS Law on EU Food Regulations, “the (SPS) Agreement 
establishes fundamental tension between, on the one hand, the national regulator’s freedom to 
choose the measures deemed appropriate, and on the other, a notable scientific evidentiary 
burden” (p. 10). Aaronson & Zimmerman (2008) in Trade Imbalance: the Struggle to Weight 
Human Rights Concern in Trade Policy Making explained that “WTO rules do limit how and 
when policymakers can use trade policy tools to protect human rights” (Aaronson & 
Zimmerman, 2008, p. 191).  Although, contrary to the common allegation that “the WTO 
directly undermines human right,” the WTO rules do not discuss or make explicit reference of 
human rights, and neither does the WTO in any way purport to address human rights issues 
(Aaoronson & Zimmerman, 2008, p. 191). Moreover, the authors found that WTO membership 
may have surprising outcomes in raising the recognition of certain human rights since all 
members must develop regulation in “a transparent, accountable manner,” which in turn, opens 
the opportunity for public participation to citizens and traders (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008, 
p. 193). Aaronson & Zimmerman (2008) proposed avenues that can be used by WTO members 
to address human rights issues at home or abroad, as can be seen in Table 10 below. 
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Table 10. The WTO system and where human rights may enter the discussion 
(Aaronson & Zimmerman 2008, p. 40) 
 
  
Accession  Nations have not introduced human rights concerns, per se, in accessions but some members 
have become increasingly concerned about human rights and, in particular, the rule of law in 
acceding countries. In the China accession, China was asked to enforce all of its laws in all 
of its territories, including export processing zones. 
Nonapplications When nation accedes, WTO members may choose not to extend trade rights and privileges. 
The United State uses nonapplication to deny trading rights to Romania when it was 
communist and undemocratic. 
General 
Exceptions 
Article XX includes language allowing nations to restrict trade when necessary to protect 
life, protect public morals, secure compliance or converse natural resources. Article XXI 
allow member states to restrict trade for reasons of national security. 
Waivers The Kimberley waiver for conflict diamonds was the first waiver approved for a human 
rights purpose. Stimulated by UN Security Council Resolution and broad member interest 
and support. Preference programs were originally put in place under a waiver. Some 
preference programs have human rights conditionality. 
Dispute 
Settlement 
There have been no disputes that centered directly on human rights questions. First dispute 
on public morals (internet gambling) was in 2005 — food safety disputes to some degrees 
center on the right to health (but not explicitly defended as human right concerns, e.g., the 
beef hormones case). 
Trade Policy 
Reviews (TPR) 
The WTO Secretariat and member states jointly review trade policies and practices of 
member states. Larger trading nations are reviewed more frequently. Officials increasingly 
bring up human right concerns, particularly labor rights, in these discussions. 
Amendments to 
existing 
agreements or 
clarifications 
WTO members recognize there are times when they need to provide greater guidance to 
member states. In the amendment, members agree to alter existing agreements to stipulate 
what member states can or cannot do, as in intellectual property rights (IPR) and the right to 
health (access to affordable medicines). In addition, members have agreed to further 
discussions to clarify the relationship between IPR and traditional knowledge. Such actions 
are rare. 
Negotiations Some members sought to include labor rights in negotiation, but they failed. Members have 
discussed nontrade issues such as access to affordable food and food security in agricultural 
negotiations. 
 
Government policies that can disturb trade, including policies that are implemented to 
promote human rights abroad or domestically, sometimes can be effectively limited by the WTO 
principles (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008). Some might believe, therefore, that the WTO 
system reduces available state policy options to fulfil their obligation to promote and protect 
human rights (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008). Table 10 provides evidence otherwise, providing 
eight paths wherein human rights can be promoted in the WTO system, for example, dispute 
settlement, trade policy reviews, and negotiation. Interestingly,  in the case of dispute settlement, 
Aaronson & Zimmerman (2008) showed that no disputes directly focusing on human rights 
 
129 
 
questions had been ever brought up. The reason for this is, at least to some extent, that it is 
unlikely for a WTO member who violates human rights to challenge trade restriction sanctions 
impeded upon them. For example, it is unlikely for Burma to challenge the US for trade 
sanctions that are applied by the US to pressure Burma to alter its human rights practice 
(Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008).  The example on Table 10 shows that the cases of dispute 
settlement related to food safety, are implicitly leaned toward the right to health, and not directly 
to the right to adequate food (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008). It is reasonable, because 
discourse on the right to safe food, and as well its link to the international food trade, is still 
limited. Presumably, no countries have used the right to safe food approach during a WTO 
dispute settlement. As stated by Allain (2018), until now, “the right to adequate food remains 
focused – and rightly so – on hunger and providing access to food to all of the world’s 
population” (p. 363).   
Although rare, when necessary, WTO members can also make amendments or 
clarifications in particular WTO agreements (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008). Generally, the 
amendments and clarifications do not address human rights issues, but lately, WTO members 
have found it necessary to clarify WTO rules related to human rights, such as the right to health, 
by including public health exceptions to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights/TRIPS (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008). Aaronson & Zimmerman (2008) 
proposed that trade negotiations offer the most direct paths to help address human rights in trade 
talks, including in instances of the right to food.  
Soetoto (2018) argued that Indonesia’s membership in WTO creates certain difficulties 
for Indonesia as a sovereign state. On the one hand, Indonesia participates as a member of the 
WTO, so it is not excluded internationally, “on the other hand [Indonesia has] to defend the 
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sovereignty of the nation and the welfare of the whole society, including traditional [small] 
farmer” (Soetoto, 2018). Arguably, along with improving public health protection, food safety 
standards have also been used by wealthier countries as a protectionist tool that creates uneven 
barriers to trade. The stringent food safety standard might limit the capacity of small farmers to 
enter the market with higher food safety standards and hamper the rights (such as the right to 
work and right to adequate living) of small local producers. 
 Indonesia must respect, protect and fulfill the right of their people to adequate food, 
including safe and nutritious food. The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) means Indonesia must 
proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access to safe food. Adopting a 
positive list system as a food safety standard in Indonesia may offer a simplified solution to 
provide better protection for public health, especially from hazardous imported foods. The 
policymakers have the responsibility to balance the economic benefits (right to work, especially 
for small local farmers and other producers, and the right to adequate standard of living) and 
public health protection (right to adequate food, including safe food) to ensure a comprehensive 
regulation. Aaronson and Zimmerman (2008) advise that, to make more inclusive policies, 
policymakers should develop a regular channel for human right concerns to enter into the policy-
making process and policy-makers should consult with human right advocates and human right 
officials before they make trade policy decisions. Within the province of its national sovereignty, 
Indonesia’s government should have the right to choose the levels of protection considered 
adequate and proper for its people. Furthermore, Indonesia’s government, if necessary, should be 
able to adopt and implement the same level of food safety standards as developed countries, 
including default MRLs, without the heavy burden of providing scientific justification. 
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3.3.2. Risk-based inspection for imported food 
Regarding the implementation of food safety control for imported products at the borders, 
respondents (public officials and importers) generally divided into two opinion groups: (a) those 
who think that Regime 3 (See Chapter 1) is more complicated and confusing than Regime 1 or 2; 
or (b) those who argue that the latest regulation is the most suitable mechanism because of the 
risk-based inspection scheme, but agree that risk assessment and adequate monitoring are 
needed.  Respondents who prefer Regime 1 as an ideal food control mechanism preferred the 
simplicity of the inspection system and promoted the development of a monitoring system with a 
strengthened capacity of the food safety laboratories. Along these lines, interviewee Wahidin 
(2018) argued that Indonesia needs to change the paradigm from end-product inspection to risk-
based inspection. He proposed that with its limited capacities and resources, Indonesia should 
conduct law reform to support adopting the risk analysis approach to determine a ranking on 
food safety risk.  
The FAO (n.d) recommends that developing countries use a  specific food safety risk-
analysis approach because it can help them determine priority needs to protect public health and 
to choose where to invest resources to get the best benefits. Risk analysis can be applied to help 
develop strong program policy based on the local context, both for standard setting and for 
choosing which surveillance programmes should be prioritized (FAO, n.d.). Wahidin (2018) 
agreed that Indonesia might follow Malaysia and other developing countries by adapting the 
deferral system into its national regulation. As shown by the findings from secondary data 
analysis, a multi-step deferral policy may be a strategy for lower-income countries to improve 
their food safety control on pesticide residues. However, Wahidin (2018) also pointed out that 
Indonesia should consider the social and economic impacts of setting a stringent standard by 
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conducting an adequate risk analysis before adopting that standard. Among other things, the risk 
analysis should include an analysis of the capacity of Indonesia’s farmers to be able to follow the 
stricter standard or regulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
“Food sovereignty in Indonesia will never be achieved until the “mouth” of Indonesia’s 
people is set free,” said Professor Ahmad Sulaeman (2018), a well-known food safety expert 
from Bogor Agricultural University when asked about the government policy on imported food. 
His sentiment is understandable, discourse on the right to food and food sovereignty is always 
entangled with the autonomy of a person to make a sensible personal choice (right to food 
choice). When food – its access, quality, quantity, and availability – is left to the market, poor 
people with lower purchasing power will end up consuming the cheapest and less safe domestic 
food. When food safety is no longer a matter of individual choice, but simply one of the personal 
constraints, then the government must provide a public guarantee of food safety standards 
(Hanak et al., 2002). However, what happens when the state that supposedly fulfills its obligation 
to the right to safe food has practical constraints such as limited resources and insufficient 
knowledge to establish an adequate food safety standard? The lack of resources and capacities 
can hamper that state’s capacity to develop a proper scientific justification as mandated by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and thus can create inequality in public health protection 
between developed and developing countries.  
This thesis has described structural conditions in international trade rules that, in the case 
of Indonesia, prevent the realization of the human right to food and food sovereignty for its 
people. Several recommendations have been discussed, as follows: 
1. Evolve the human right to food safety at the international level by addressing discrimination 
and lack of equity in international trade rules concerning food safety, for example by 
addressing food safety as a condition of the right to food, thereby encouraging states to 
balance their obligations as duty-bearers to meet public health obligations while not 
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disempowering individuals’ and communities’ capacities to feed themselves adequately and 
sustainably; 
2. Democratize local and national food governance through increased civil society participation 
including by traditional food producers;  
3. Centralize food safety governance at the national level to maximize food safety and (ideally) 
also improve trade efficiency (Bernauer & Caduff, 2003). 
4. Conduct law reform in Indonesia, for example by adopting the precautionary principle in its 
Food Law and establish a risk-analysis center, so that Indonesia can provide scientific 
justification to develop a better food safety standard. 
Some interviewees suggested that the United Nation needs to promote a more progressive 
right to food approach. Aaronson & Zimmerman (2008) recommended some options to assist 
policymakers in balancing the human right to food and international trade when developing food 
policy such as: 
1. Make a policy determination that trade and human rights should be coordinated, for 
example by encouraging trade and human rights policymakers to work together to 
coordinate their efforts to address the human rights issue; 
2. Reform national trade policy-making process, so human right advocates and 
policymakers are involved with trade policy-making;  
3. Develop an advisory structure and task advisors, to ask the right question when 
making public policy decision at the intersection of trade and human rights;  
4. Create a coalition of “the willing” at the WTO to bring greater attention to human 
rights and trade;  
5. Encourage business to make human rights a business priority;  
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6. Clarify the relationship between voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
strategies that promote human rights and WTO rules;  
7. Encourage and disseminate further research on how trade and trade agreements might 
affect certain human rights; and  
8. Explore a human rights impact assessment mechanism (p. 199-206). 
For futher research, it is important to investigate and experiment with venues for civil society 
participation in the making of food policy in Indonesia. Examples in this direction might include 
the adoption of a food policy council model adapted for the Indonesian national context, or the 
institutionalized inclusion of civil society and CSO representatives in public hearings that 
address food, agriculture, and health policy with an emphasis on food safety. Food safety 
challenges must use “multidisciplinary and multisector partnerships and collaborations on 
continuous, permanent basis” since the world cannot reach global food security and better 
nutrition without safe food (Crean & Ayalew, 2016). After all, as stated by Crean & Ayalew 
(2016), “If it’s not safe, it’s not food.” 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Full Expedited Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol from the Syracuse 
University IRB 
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Appendix 2. First IRB amendment request to add more public sector officials as participants 
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Appendix 3. Second IRB amendment to add an oral consent form 
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Appendix 4. Interview Questions  
 
SAMPLE: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Interview Question will generally be divided into several main themes as follows: 
A. Related to Food sovereignty and human right to food: 
 
- How do you (or your organization) perceive food sovereignty, food security, and food safety? 
- How does Indonesia’s government (or government in general) translate food policy, particularly 
food safety policy? 
- What do you think about the correlation between food sovereignty and food safety?  
- What is your opinion to the concept of food sovereignty in Indonesian Food Law Number 18/2012? 
What do you think about the implementation of this Law?  
- What is your opinion on human right to food in general? How about human right to safe food? 
- In relation to human right to food, what do you think the significance of food sovereignty, food 
security and food safety policy? 
- What do you think about WTO and human right to food? 
 
B. Related to food safety and international trade: 
- How does you or your organization translate food safety policy for imported agri-products? 
- What do you think of the role of international bodies such as WTO on food safety trade? 
- Do you think international agreements such as SPS agreement or Codex standards affect the 
government (Indonesia’s government) approach in designing their food safety policy? 
- Every country, as the member of the WTO, has the obligation to comply with the Agreement on 
the Application of SPS Measures (the "SPS Agreement") and additionally expected to follow the 
Codex Alimentarius guidelines. How important do you think to abide to the International rules on 
food trade? 
- What do you think about the WTO fairness on their roles in international food trade? 
- Codex has two primary purposes: protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fair practices in 
food trade. What your opinion regarding those roles, particularly the second role? 
- Do you think there is a disparity on food safety standards between WTO members? 
 
 
 
  
 
142 
 
Appendix 5. List of Interviewees and Interview Methods 
Interviewee Title Status Source Saturation Format Length Recording 
CATEGORY 1: GOVERNMENT FOOD SAFETY OFFFICIALS Yes    
PO 01 Head of Plant Quarantine 
Division in BBKP Tj. Priok 
Conducted in 
person  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
59 minutes Audio-
recording 
PO 02 Food Safety Analyst in Lab 
at BBKP Tj. Priok 
Conducted in 
person  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
20 minutes  Audio-
recording 
PO 03 Quarantine Officer  Conducted in 
person  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
~30 minutes Concurrent 
notes 
PO 04 Quarantine Officer Conducted in 
person  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
~30 minutes Concurrent 
notes 
PO 05  Policy officer at Central 
Office of IAQA 
Interviewed 
via Google 
Hang Out  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
28 minutes Audio-
recording 
CATEGORY 2: CSO Yes    
CSO 01 Secretary General FIAN Conducted in 
person 
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
1 hour 6 
minutes 
Audio-
recording 
CSO 02 KPKR Skype 
Interview  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
47 minutes Audio-
recording 
CSO 03 Oxfam Indonesia Skype 
Interview  
Substitute in 
sample frame 
 Semi-
structured 
34 minutes Audio-
recording 
CSO 04 Indonesia Berseru Skype 
Interview  
Referred by 
Sample Frame 
 Semi-
structured 
1 hour 16 
minutes 
 minutes 
Audio-
recording 
CSO 05 IGJ Skype 
Interview  
Substitute in 
sample frame 
 Semi-
structured 
1 hour 23 
minutes 
Audio-
recording 
CATEGORY 3: RESEARCHERS No    
R 01 IPB  Conducted in 
person 
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
1 hour 6 
minutes 
Concurrent 
notes 
R 01 WUR/ NFDCA Skype 
Interview  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
1 hour 48 
minutes 
Audio-
recording 
CATEGORY 4: IMPORTERS No    
I 01 Importer at Soekarno-Hatta 
airport  
Conducted in 
person 
Convenience 
sampling 
 Semi-
structured 
10 minutes Concurrent 
notes 
I 02 Unilever Skype 
Interview  
Sample Frame  Semi-
structured 
36 minutes Audio-
recording 
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